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Short-Time Work Benefits Revisited: 
Some Lessons from the Great Recession
* 
 
The Great Recession triggered a resurgence of short-time work (STW) throughout the 
OECD. Several countries introduced from scratch STW or significantly expanded the scope 
of the programmes already in place. In some countries like Italy, Japan and Germany 
between 2.5 and 5 per cent of the workforce participated in short-time work schemes at the 
trough of the recession. In this paper we analyse the rationale for short time work benefits 
and their effects on labour adjustment from both a cross-country and a time-series 
perspective. We find that STW actually contributed to reduce job losses during the Great 
Recession. However, the number of jobs saved, according to our macroeconomic estimates, 
is smaller than the full-time equivalents jobs involved by these programmes, pointing in some 
cases to sizeable deadweight costs. Other institutions, like plant-level bargaining over hours, 
wages and employment levels may be more effective than STW in encouraging adjustment 
along the intensive margins in presence of temporary shocks. Our results also suggest that 
STW cannot be readily extended to countries having much different institutional 
configurations as the demand for STW is very much affected by other institutions such as 
employment protection legislation and the degree of centralization of collective bargaining. 
The micro evidence from firm-level data in Germany is more encouraging as to the 
effectiveness of STW, pointing to rather moderate deadweight losses. We interpret this result 
as due to specific design features of the German STW that could make it more effective in 
addressing the moral hazard problems related to reliance on subsidised hour reductions. The 
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Introduction 
 
Germany’s jobs miracle hasn’t received much 
attention in this country — but it’s real, it’s 
striking (…) Germany came into the Great 
Recession with strong employment protection 
legislation. This has been supplemented with 
a “short-time work scheme”, which provides 
subsidies to employers who reduce workers’ 
hours rather than laying them off. These 
measures didn’t prevent a nasty recession, 
but Germany got through the recession with 
remarkably few job losses. 
(Paul Krugman, NYT, 12 November 2009) 
 
 
The above quotes from the 2008 Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman, one of the most influential 
opinion-makers in the US, offer a good example of the rediscovery of short-time work (STW) 
schemes during the Great Recession. In the previous two decades all the attention of policy-
makers, “social partners” and scholars of labour economics had been turned away from this 
institution. It suddenly became very popular in 2009. Kurzarbeit, the German version of STW, 
is being celebrated in policy discussions around the world as the main factor behind the 
German  “job  miracle”.  In  order  to  find  so  much  support  for  a  European  labour  market 
institution in the US one has to go back to the 1960s when senior US policy-makers like 
Robert Myers were stating that “it would be short-sighted to ignore Europe’s recent success 
in holding down unemployment” declaring to be “looking enviously at our European friends 
to see how they do it”. The adoption of STW for countries where this instrument currently 
does not exist or plays only a minor role has also been advocated, inter alia, in the Spring 
edition  of  the  2010  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook  and  in  the  2010  issue  of  the  OECD 
Employment Outlook. 
 
Is all this praise justified? Is the German employment miracle really associated with STW? 
Why then did short-time work not play the same role during the previous recessions and in 
other countries that also have a long tradition with STW schemes? And can STW be adopted 
also in completely different institutional landscapes, e.g., in the US labour market? These 
issues are relevant in a context where it is proving very difficult in most advanced countries 
to absorb the 30 million unemployed persons who lost their jobs during the Great Recession. 
 
There  are  a  number  of  trade-offs  involved  by  the  introduction  of  a  STW  scheme:  this 
institution  may  distort  adjustment  along  the  intensive  margin  of  hours  of  work;  it  may 
prevent reallocation of workers from firms facing structural problems to firms with a strong 
growth potential, thereby reducing the “cleansing effects” of recessions. STW schemes are 
also costly measures although much less than bank rescue operations. Expenditure on STW 
climbed in 2009 to some 5 billion Euros in Germany, 5.5 billion Euros in Italy and roughly 6 
billion Euros in Japan, between .1 and .3 per cent of GDP in these three countries which 
made the largest use of this scheme.  
 
The aggregate figures are, prima facie, rather impressive. In Germany, Japan and Italy, the 
number of employees involved in STW attained at the trough of the recession between 2.5   3 
and 5 per cent of the labour force. At the same time, unemployment had increased in these 
countries, heavily affected by export demand shocks and the subsequent decline in output, 
only  moderately  if  at  all.  This  does  not  imply  that  the  initial  success  in  containing 
unemployment  is  related  to  STW.  Other  institutions,  such  as  employment  protection 
legislation  (EPL)  or  decentralized  bargaining  allowing  to  reduction  in  working  hours  to 
preserve jobs, may have been equally, if not more, important in avoiding large scale layoffs. 
Moreover, STW can be at best a device to buy time when facing a temporary shock, just like 
notice periods in EPL. Over a few quarters, if macroeconomic conditions do not improve, 
STW may well turn out to be much less effective in containing job losses. STW is also a multi-
dimensional institution that has to be properly designed in terms of the replacement rates 
offered for the income-hours reductions, the minimum and maximum duration of benefits, 
the eligibility conditions, the work-tests required to beneficiaries, etc. Different countries 
have made different choices as to these design features of STW and we can learn much by 
comparing the performance of different arrangements in the context of the Great Recession. 
 
Surprisingly enough, there is little theoretical work on the rationale for STW and, above all, 
on those design features of STW which are bound to improve its performance in containing 
wage deflation and reducing excessive layoffs. There are also a very few empirical studies on 
the  macroeconomic  effects  of  STW  and  on  the  relationship  between  short-time  work 
benefits and job reallocation at the industry and firm levels. 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  filling  these  gaps  by  exploiting  the  policy 
experiments with STW carried out during the Great Recession in adjusting the size and the 
coverage of this instrument as well as its duration and financing. In particular, our aim is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the key features that make short-time work benefits 
effective in containing job losses and preventing  wage deflation  without obstructing job 
reallocation in the aftermath of a recession.  
 
We find that STW actually contributed to reduce job losses during the Great Recession. 
However, the number of jobs saved, according to our macroeconomic estimates, is smaller 
than the full-time equivalents involved by these programmes, pointing in some cases to 
sizeable deadweight costs. Other institutions, like plant-level bargaining over hours, wages 
and  employment  levels  may  be  more  effective  in  encouraging  adjustment  along  the 
intensive margins in presence of temporary shocks. Our results also suggest that STW cannot 
be readily extended across countries having much different institutional configurations as 
the  demand  for  STW  is  very  much  affected  by  other  institutions  such  as  employment 
protection legislation and the centralization of wage bargaining.  We also identify design 
features of STW that could make it more effective in addressing the moral hazard problems 
related to reliance on this policy instrument. The German Kurzarbeit scheme is particularly 
well designed as it discourages 100 per cent hours reductions and is experience-rated. This 
contributes to explain why our microeconomic estimates find little evidence of deadweight 
costs in Germany. 
 
The paper is structured in four parts: First, in Section 2, we present some stylized facts about 
the adjustment along intensive and extensive margins and the scope of short-time work 
schemes in G7 countries. We also describe how these schemes operate in practice in the 
countries that make the largest use of it. Next, in Section 3 we review the theory of STW and   4 
discuss  the  relevant  interactions  of  short-time  work  with  other  institutions,  such  as 
employment  protection  legislation  and  unemployment  benefits.  Section  4  is  devoted  to 
empirically  assess  take-up  rates  and  to  investigate  the  contribution  offered  by  STW  to 
containing job losses during the Great Recession in the different countries. Finally, Section 5 
highlights the design features of STW which contribute to improve the effectiveness of these 
institutions in preventing excess job losses during the recession without hindering structural 
change and the reallocation of jobs and workers in the recovery. 
 
1.  The Resurgence of Short-Time Work  
 
Krugman, in his op-ed probably had in mind some variant of Figure 1. The top panel displays 
the adjustment of the extensive and intensive margins during the Great Recession, where the 
extensive margin is defined as the employment rate, that is number of employed people over 
the working age population, and the intensive as the hours worked per employee. In spite of 
the greater severity of the recession in Germany (where output fell by a cumulative 6.6 per 
cent) than in the US (-4.1 per cent), the employment rate in Germany did not decline (and 
unemployment did not rise) while very large job losses were experienced in the US, where 
employment felt by a cumulative 6 per cent and unemployment more than doubled attaining 




Notes: 2007 Q1=100 for employment, average hours worked and real GDP. STW take-up rate is computed as % 
of all employees. 
 
Source:  average  hours  worked  and  real  GDP  from  IMF;  employment  from  OECD;  STW  for  Germany  from 
Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn (2010), STW for US from US Labour Department. 
   5 
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the fraction of the labour force involved in Short-time 
Work in the two countries. While Germany made a very large use of its Kurzarbeit scheme 
aimed at preserving jobs in firms experiencing temporary falls in demand, in the US there was 
not a significant pick-up in the work sharing arrangements existing in a number of States, in 
spite of the gravity of the recession. The parallel between the asymmetries in the adjustment 
along the two margins and the scale of the STW is quite striking. Hence, the praise of the STW 
by the 2008 Nobel laureate. 
 
Germany, however, is not the only country to have enhanced STW during the recession. A 
similar  strategy  was  followed  also  by  Japan  and  Italy  that  experienced  output  falls 
comparable to those of Germany (-6.8 per cent in Italy and -8.7 per cent in Japan). As shown 
by Figure 2, in the latter two countries adjustment occurred to a large extent along the 




Notes: Q1=100 for employment, average hours worked and real GDP. STW take-up rate is computed as  % of the 
labour force.  
 
Source: average hours worked and real GDP from IMF; employment from OECD and STW from Alexander Hijzen 
and Danielle Venn (2010). 
 
Another observation pointing to the role of STW concerns the role played by adjustment 
along the intensive margins compared with previous recession episodes. Table 1 looks at the 
share of total hours decline during downturns (identified by using the OECD classification of 
recessions) in the component related to hours per employee variation and the component 
related  to  changes  in  the  number  of  employees.  In  particular,  we  apply  the  following 
decomposition of the variance in total hours 
 
log (ΔH) = Δlog(h) + Δlog(n)  (1)   6 
 
where ΔH denotes the first difference in total hours worked, while h and n refer to the 
average  number  of  hours  worked  per  employee  and  the  total  number  of  employees 
respectively.  The  first  term  on  the  right-hand-side  represents  the  variation  along  the 
intensive margin and the second term the variation along the extensive margin. They are 
both expressed in Table 1 as a fraction of the total hours variation. Our data cover the period 
1970 to 2009, hence historical recessions include the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the 1992 
recession, the dotcom bust as well as country-specific recessions. 
 




Historical Average  
(previous recessions) 
Canada  56.32%  41% 
France  55.13%  58% 
Germany  117.35%  48% 
Italy  79.47%  31% 
Japan  91.31%  89% 
UK  48.34%  46% 
US  35.64%  47% 
 
Notes: adjustment in intensive margin is equal to the rate of change of average hours worked per worker from 
peak to trough divided by the rate of change of total hours worked over the same period.  
 
Source: number of employees from OECD; average hours worked from IMF 
 
The table indicates that Germany and Italy, the two countries of the G7 with the largest use 
of  work-sharing  arrangements  displayed  in  2008-9  more  adjustment  along  the  intensive 
margin than the other G7 countries and they did so more than in previous recessions. Japan 
also relied more than other countries on hours adjustment but not more than in previous 
recessions. Also in Canada the importance of the intensive margin as shock absorber was 
enhanced  in  the  Great  Recession,  while  the  opposite  happened  in  the  US,  where  firms 
adjusted to the recession mainly by dismissing workers rather than by reducing working 
hours.  
 
Short-time work is likely to have played an important role in promoting more adjustment of 
hours than headcounts employment. Table 2 provides some information on the scale of STW 
in  the  countries  for  which  this  information  is  available  and  meaningful  cross-country 
comparisons can be carried out. In particular, we provide three measures of the size of these 
programmes. The first measure is the raw number of participants as a percentage of  all 
employees. Some short-time workers may reduce hours of work by a very small amount and 
yet they would be counted by this measure just like workers involved in a 100 per cent hours 
reduction. The second measure involves some adjustment for the actual hours reductions: it 
is  based  on  an  estimate  of  the  number  of  full-time  equivalent  jobs  involved  by  these 
schemes, normalized by the population of full-time employees. The estimate of the full-time 
equivalents draws on information collected by Hijzen and Venn (2010) on the average hours 
reduction in different STW schemes. Finally, the third measure takes hours of STW over total 
hours worked in the previous five years (a proxy for standard hours at the aggregate level).   7 
Clearly different measures address different issues (how many jobs involved? how sizeable is 
the hours reduction?) and therefore it is useful to look at them in conjunction. We also show 
the levels of these measures before the Great Recession and in 2009.  
 
Table 2 The scale of STW programmes 
Average quarterly take-up rates by country 
Country 




FTE over Full-Time 
Employees 
STW Hours over Total 
Hours Worked 
2007  2009  2007  2009  2007  2009 
Austria  0.0%  0.7%  0.0%  0.2%  0.0%  0.2% 
Belgium  3.2%  5.6%  1.8%  3.0%  1.4%  2.4% 
Canada  0.0%  0.3%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0%  0.1% 
Finland  0.4%  1.7%  0.4%  2.0%  0.4%  1.5% 
France  0.4%  0.9%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1%  0.2% 
Germany  0.1%  3.2%  0.2%  1.8%  0.0%  1.1% 
Italy  0.7%  3.3%  0.7%  3.2%  0.4%  2.0% 
Japan*  0.0%  2.7%  0.0%  1.1%  0.0%  0.7% 
Norway  0.1%  0.6%  0.1%  0.2%  0.1%  0.7% 
Switzerland  0.0%  1.1%  0.0%  0.5%  0.0%  0.4% 
Notes: Japan 2007 refers to 2008 Q2.  
FTE take-up rate = (Stock of Participants into STW x Average Hours Reduction)/(Full-time Employees + STW full-
time equivalents) 
STW Hours over Total Hours calculated as follows: Total STW Hours/(Previous five years average of total hours 
worked in the economy + Total STW hours), where Total STW Hours = (STW full-time equivalents x average 
number of hours worked by a full-time worker in a year).  
 
Source: data on short-time workers drawn from Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn, 2010 OECD Working 
Paper; data on total hours worked and total labour force from OECD. 
 
As shown in the Table, in many countries these schemes were rather insignificant in 2007, 
while they had climbed to relatively high levels by 2009. In addition to Germany, Japan and 
Italy, also Belgium and Finland enrolled in these schemes more than 1 per cent of the labour 
force and up to 2 per cent of the total hours worked under normal business conditions.  
 
There  are  a  number  of  issues  that  are  raised  by  these  observations.  It  is  important 
addressing them in order to prevent that the resurgence of interest about STW generates 
myths. Governments could be induced to introduce on a large scale work-sharing schemes 
even in institutional landscapes in which they are not likely to operate efficiently. 
 
Among the issues: Why are STW schemes used in some countries and not in others? Which 
design features of STW make them more palatable for employers and workers? Are there 
relevant interactions with other institutions, protecting workers against labour market risk 
that could possibly enhance their role in promoting work sharing throughout recessions? 
And how large are deadweight losses associated with STW schemes? 
 
In the next sections, we will address these issues providing preliminary answers drawing on 
evidence  before,  during,  and  after  the  Great  Recession.  Our  starting  point  must  be  an   8 
assessment of the objectives of STW and its likely interactions with other institutions. Before 
going to the data we need some guidance from economic theory.  
 
2.  Some Theory: STW and other institutions 
 
The stated goal of STW is to encourage firms to adjust labour in response to adverse shocks 
by reducing hours worked per employee rather than by implementing layoffs. In presence of 
production technologies allowing for some substitutability in the labour input between the 
number of employees and the number of hours worked per employee (Rosen, 1985; Fitzroy 
and Hart, 1985), reductions in labour costs are typically accommodated by reducing the 
number of workers rather than by work-sharing, that is, lower hours (and weekly wages) for 
all the employees. This bias towards layoffs can be readily characterised by considering the 
cost  minimization  problem  of  a  firm  facing  exogenous  variations  in  the  demand  for  its 
product. 
 
Suppose that firms produce output, y, using only labour which requires some combination of 
workers,  n,  and  hours  of  work,  h.  In  particular,  assume  that  the  production  function  is 
multiplicatively separable, that is,  given by y=n
αh
β where 0<α, β≤1. This functional form 
allows  for  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  both  hours  (working  longer  hours  reduces 
productivity at the margin) and workers (there may be constraints in office space or in work 
organization  reducing  the  marginal  contribution  to  production  of  the  last  worker  being 
hired). It also encompasses the case where reductions in hours worked per employee are 
isomorphic to reductions in the number of employees from the standpoint of production 
technologies. This happens to be when α,β=1. In this case the curve displaying the same 





Labour costs typically feature not only variable costs (the hourly wages, w times the number 
of hours worked) but also fixed costs per worker, F, e.g., related to the training of workers, 
and their office space, i.e.: 
 
  (2) 
 
The  dotted  curve  in  Figure  3  displays  all  the  combinations  of  hours  and  workers 
corresponding to the same labour costs or the isocost for labour curve. Per any given level of   9 
output, the optimal choice of the firm will combine hours and workers in such a way as to 
attain  the  targeted  output  level  at  the  lowest  costs,  that  is,  where  the  isocost  curve  is 
tangent to the isolabour curve corresponding to this level of output. The formal derivation of 
this condition is provided in Annex 1 for the general case where higher wages have to be 
paid  to  convince  the  employees  to  work  longer  hours,  i.e.,  where  w=w(h)  and  w’>0.  It 
obtains the (conditional) demands for hours and workers  
 
 ,  (3) 
and 
 
,  (4) 
 
respectively, where  denotes the elasticity of wages to hours of work. Notice that the 
optimal choice of hours of the firm is independent of the targeted scale of production,  , 
while this is not the case for the choice of workers. In other words, changes in the scale of 
production affect the number of workers, but not the hours of work per employees. This is 
consistent with the observation in several industries of broadly the same number of hours 
worked per employee independently of the size of the firms. By the same token, a reduction 
in costs required to match a decline in the targeted output level associated with an adverse 
shock, will be accommodated by reducing the number of workers rather than by reducing 
the hours of work. This result, also formally proved in Annex 1, stems from the production 
technologies allowing for substitutability between hours and workers as well as the presence 
of fixed costs per worker. 
 
This bias of employment adjustment toward workers leads to “excessive” job losses (Hall 
and  Lazear,  1984;  Farber,  Hall  and  Pencavel,  1993;  Hall,  1995)  during  recessions  or  in 
presence of shocks temporarily reducing the demand for specific industries and firms.  It 
would instead be both “more equitable and efficient” (Reid, 1985) to reduce hours of work 
for everybody. The inefficiency of this type of adjustment is related to the different degree 
of risk aversion of workers and firms. Workers are risk averse and would be better off by 
working less hours (and earning less) during downturns, but avoiding job losses. Employers 
having access to capital markets are instead risk neutral and could in principle “sell” an 
insurance to their workers, which avoids job losses in exchange for lower wages throughout 
the  employment  relationship.  An  additional  source  of  inefficiency  of  labour  adjustment 
carried out along the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin of hours of work is 
related to the fiscal costs of dismissals (Burdett and Wright (1989); van Audenrode (1994)): 
in presence of unemployment benefit systems, employers laying off their workers exert a 
negative fiscal externality, by imposing a higher expenditure for unemployment benefits.  
 
While it is possible to find arguments for work-sharing arrangements purely on efficiency 
grounds, this does not imply that such arrangements should be offered by the public sector. 
Private  contractual  arrangements  between  workers  and  employers  can,  by  themselves, 
counteract the intrinsic bias of labour adjustment toward layoffs, by including contingency 
provisions allowing for hours adjustment in response to changes in demand conditions. The 
Working Time Accounts introduced in Germany in the mid-1990s are one of these private 
contractual arrangements and are described in some detail in Section 4. The case for state   10 
intervention  can  only  be  made  on  second-best  grounds.  In  many  countries,  collective 
bargaining over pay and working conditions is centralized at the national or industry level. 
Even when decentralized, plant-level, bargaining is allowed, it rarely involves small units, 
where typically there are no collective organizations of workers at the workplace. All this 
prevents  introducing  work  sharing  arrangement  at  the  plant  level.  At  the  same  time,  a 
centralized collective agreement typically features minimum levels of pay, the definition of 
“standard”  hours  and  norms  for  overtime  pay  and  shifts  to  be  applied  to  all  firms 
represented at the bargaining table. This centralized agreement could, in principle, include 
contingency  provisions  reacting  to  aggregate  shocks,  but  it  is  very  unlikely  to  deal  with 
idiosyncratic shocks and cannot take into account of firms’ specificities as to the degree of 
substitutability between hours and workers in the production process.  
 
Another factor that stands on the way of private STW arrangements is the imperfection of 
capital markets. Small firms, in particular, may have limited access to financial markets. Thus, 
they could face liquidity constraints when required to offer insurance to their workers by 
keeping them on their payroll even in presence of adverse shocks (Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011). 
This problem is clearly particularly relevant under financial crises like the Great Recession.  
 
A publicly operated STW system, however, involves the same moral hazard problems arising 
in  the  provision  of  unemployment  insurance.  Workers  and  employers  may  collude  in 
extracting payments from the state even when incentives to hours reductions would not be 
required  to  avoid  layoffs  as  the  firm  is  no  longer  facing  a  negative  demand  shock. 
Appropriate design features of these schemes, such as “experience rating” (Feldstein, 1976; 
Blanchard and Tirole, 2007), that is, imposing to employers making use of STW to contribute 
more than the employers not drawing on public resources, could reduce the risk of abuse of 
these schemes. However, full experience-rating may not be feasible or optimal (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2008) precisely for the same constraints that prevent a fully private provision of 
work sharing arrangements, notably in small firms. Moreover, raising the costs of STW for 
employers, forcing them to internalize at least partly the fiscal externality they impose on 
other firms and workers has the consequence of reducing the use of STW, hence the extent 
of hours adjustment in presence of demand shocks. 
 
Macro models provide a case for a publicly operated STW  as a device to prevent wage 
deflation in the context of temporary slowdowns in economic activity. STW contributes to 
avoiding a spiral of declining employment, wages and hence aggregate demand which would 
cause a deeper fall in output. This suggests that STW should be made particularly attractive 
for firms under downturns in order to maximize take-up. One way to reconcile this objective 
with  the  goal  of  reducing  moral  hazard  is  to  allow  for  cyclically  adjusted  employers’ 
contributions: payroll taxes financing STW should decline during downturns and increase 
during upturns. 
  
The  discussion  above  indicates  that  the  design  features  of  STW  are  very  important  in 
affecting both its success among employers and workers and its efficiency properties. In 
order to gauge which factors are likely to have more of an impact on the demand for STW, it 
is useful to remind the cost minimizing choice of hours:   . This equation states that 
hours reductions could be encouraged when labour costs faced by the employers become 
more  responsive  to  changes  in  working  time,  notably  when  wages  per  worker  for  the   11 
employers decline more than proportionally with the reduction of hours of work. This is 
precisely the task which is given to STW. From the standpoint of employers, these schemes 
should increase the cost savings associated with reducing working time, while, from the 
standpoint of employees, they should minimize the fall in take-home pay. Notice further that 
STW schemes allowing for declines of hourly labour costs when hours of work are reduced 
are likely to have more of an impact in presence of relatively large fixed costs per worker, F.
1  
A significant component of these fixed costs is represented by employment protection 
legislation. The predicted role of STW in biasing labour adjustment towards hours reductions 
is also stronger the greater the technology parameter β (the elasticity of output with respect 
to hours) and the lower the elasticity of output with respect to the number of workers in the 
firm.  
 
Many  of  these  factors  affecting  the  demand  for  STW  are  firm-specific.  Production 
technologies to start with, hence the substitutability of layoffs with hours reductions, are 
likely to vary across firms. The responsiveness of wages to hour reductions is also likely to be 
different  across  production  units,  as  workers  may  have  different  preferences  over  the 
labour-leisure trade-off.  An additional source of variation in the use of subsidized hours 
adjustment  is  related  to  institutional  interactions.  In  particular,  employment  protection 
legislation  (or  experience-rated  unemployment  benefits)  increasing  the  relative  costs  of 
external  adjustment  can  promote  work-sharing,  while  generous  unemployment  benefits 
paid by all employers and workers (not only those making use of them) would operate in the 
opposite direction. Finally, as pointed out by Cahuc and Carcillo (2011), cultural traits may be 
important in the demand for STW. 
 
We will document below that there is significant cross-country heterogeneity in the design 
of STW. We will also show that this heterogeneity accounts for a substantial portion of the 
cross-country and time-series (to the extent that the design of these schemes has been 
adjusted) variation in take-up rates.  
 
 
3. Key design features of STWs  
 
It  is  misleading  to  consider  STW  as  a  fairly  homogenous  scheme  operated  at  different 
degrees in a number of countries. There are indeed substantial cross-country differences in 
crucial design features of STW, making these schemes hardly comparable along a single 
dimension. These differences can be documented by drawing on a survey recently carried 
out by the OECD and on an excellent work done by Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn in 
characterising these institutional differences (Hijzen and Venn, 2010).
2 Table A1 and A2 in 
Annex 2 summarize the institutional details provided by the OECD survey.   We  confine 
ourselves herein to defining some synthetic indicators of STWs along the dimensions which 
are more relevant according to economic theory. All indexes are normalized to be in the 0-1 
interval where 1 denotes the strictest. 
 
Our first indicator measures the strictness of eligibility criteria. It is defined by counting all 
the  categorical  or  procedural  conditions  required  to  activate  a  STW  scheme  at  the 
                                                 
1 To see this, take the first derivative of the conditional demand for hours with respect to   
2 For the EU-27, see also the comprehensive overview by Arpaia et al. (2010).   12 
workplace.  Some  countries  require  that  the  use  of  short-time  work  is  supported  by  a 
collective agreement or is at least approved by the unions when white collars are involved. 
In some countries (e.g. Germany) worker councils can initiate STW. Other countries require 
that only workers otherwise eligible to unemployment insurance are involved (recall that 
one of the arguments for STW was the desire to minimize the fiscal externalities associated 
with unemployment insurance) and only if they have a minimum contribution record. This 
prevents many workers with fixed-term contracts or part-time workers with few working 
hours to be eligible to STW. In the course of the Great Recession, these eligibility criteria 
were relaxed for workers with atypical contracts in many countries. An account of these 
reforms is offered in Annex 2. Other eligibility conditions relate to the requirement that the 
scheme is applied at least to a significant portion of the total workforce (it should be a work 
sharing device) and that the reduction exceeds a minimum fraction of the standard working 
hours.  The  rationale  behind  these  minimum  requirements  is  to  allow  only  firms  facing 
serious falls in demand to have access to STWs. Ten out of the twenty countries having STW 
feature minimum hours requirements. Formal “justification of economic need” is also often 
required. This means that firms must prove that they are facing negative demand shocks, 
e.g.  by  documenting  some  reduction  in  production  or  sales.  It  is  a  condition  aimed  at 
reducing deadweight losses. 
 
Our second index captures the strictness of entitlement criteria, that is, the conditions that 
have to be fulfilled by the firm or worker in order to continue to be eligible to STW. These 
provisions may include the obligation for the employer to provide training to short-time 
workers (as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Netherlands and Portugal), the definition of a 
restructuring  plan  (Belgium,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Poland  and  Spain),  and  the  absence  of 
dismissals  throughout  the  period  in  which  the  firm  is  using  STW  (as  in  Austria,  France, 
Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand and Poland). Some conditions may also apply to the 
employees: for instance Denmark, Finland, Norway, Germany and Spain include job search 
requirements  for  the  workers  involved  similar  to  those  involving  workers  receiving 
unemployment benefits, although these workers are still formally on the payroll of the firm. 
As in the eligibility index, we simply add up these requirements and normalize them to be in 
the zero-one interval. Needless to say, some of these conditions are rather poorly enforced: 
job search requirements are, for instance, rarely enforced, notably  during downturns.  
 
The third index measures the cost to the employers of STW. In some countries, STW are 
mainly funded via general tax revenues, while in others they are financed by social security 
contributions. Our measure considers the share of the running costs of STW which are paid 
by the employers in the first month of activation of the scheme. Firms participate in the 
costs of STW benefits either by paying a part of the working costs for the hours not worked 
(e.g.  France,  Hungary,  Japan,  Germany,  Poland,  Portugal,  Netherlands  and  the  Slovak 
Republic) or by paying full wages for an initial period (e.g. Norway and Sweden). In some of 
these  cases  firms  are  obliged  to  pay  the  full  amount  or  a  part  of  the  social  security 
contributions for the hours not worked (e.g. Germany) which discourages abuse of STW. In 
other  countries  (e.g.  Italy  and  the  US)  bonus-malus  arrangements  are  also  envisaged, 
thereby employers making use of the scheme have to pay higher contributions (this way of 
partly  internalizing  the  fiscal  externalities  associated  with  STW  is  also  defined  as 
“experience-rating”). Our index multiplies the share of total costs by the STW replacement 
rate (a measure of the total costs) adjusted by the maximum duration of the benefits. In the   13 
majority  of  the  countries  the  replacement  rate  for  the  hours  not  worked  equals  the 
replacement rate of the unemployment benefits. Since the average reduction of working 
hours is usually well below 100 per cent, workers which participate in STW schemes are 
usually  better  off  than  their  unemployed  counterparts,  in  addition  to  be  still  formally 
attached to the firm. The costs for the employer are also increasing in the extent of the 
hours reduction. In some countries, hours reductions can be as high as 100 per cent, putting 
the worker in a condition which is similar to a leave or a temporary layoff, although the 
worker is still on the firm’s payroll. In the course of the Great Recession most countries 
relaxed the restrictions on the maximum reduction of working hours. The exceptions are in 
this case Austria, Canada, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Overall, our indicator covering 
the costs to the employers can be interpreted as the inverse of the subsidy component (for 
the employer) of the STW.  
 
Finally  we  include  a  measure  of  the  responsiveness  of  STW  replacement  rates  to  hours 
reduction. While average labour costs decline, the cost per working hour tend to increase 
with the reduction of working hours (see Box 1, Box 2 and Crimman et al., 2010) unless 
short-time work is completely subsidised. The elasticity of STW to hours is given by the ratio 
of the replacement rate at the maximum hours reduction to the replacement rates at the 
minimum  hours  reduction  allowed  by  the  scheme.  This  captures  the  extent  to  which 
workers’  incomes  are  affected  by  hours  reduction,  hence  potential  pressures  for 
compensation  in  terms  of  increased  hourly  wages  by  the  employees.  This  ratio  is  then 
multiplied by the difference between the maximum and the minimum hours reductions, 
both expressed as ratios to the length of the standard working week. With the exception of 
Finland, all countries have a maximum duration period, which has been extended in the 
course of the crisis in many countries. The average duration period is 14 month in the OECD 
and the median is 12 months. Most countries which have introduced STWs during the Great 
Recession have relatively short durations, while those with a longer tradition usually allow 
firms to apply STW schemes for a longer period of time.  
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STW to hours  
Austria 
 
0.4  0.25  0.24  0.50 
Belgium 
 
0.3  0.13  0.02  0.69 
Canada 
 
1.0  0.00  0.00  0.33 
Czech Republic 
 
0.4  0.25  0.06  0.59 
Denmark 
 
0.6  0.13  0.04  0.43 
Finland 
 
0.7  0.25  0.00  - 
France 
 
0.4  0.25  0.12  0.74 
Germany 
 
0.6  0.25  0.23  0.56 
Hungary 
 
0.6  0.50  0.27  0.79 
Ireland 
 
0.4  0.25  0.00  0.26 
Italy 
 
0.2  0.25  0.22  0.81 
Japan 
 
0.6  0.00  0.00  0.65 
Korea 
 
0.7  0.00  0.00  0.92 
Luxembourg 
 
0.4  0.25  0.10  0.44 
Netherlands 
 
0.6  0.50  0.62  0.27 
New Zealand 
 
0.2  0.25  0.35  0.10 
Norway 
 
0.6  0.25  0.15  0.45 
Poland 
 
0.4  0.50  0.11  0.48 
Portugal 
 
-  0.25  0.17  0.71 
Slovak Republic 
 
0.4  0.00  0.00  0.70 
Spain 
 
0.4  0.50  0.56  0.47 
Switzerland 
 
0.5  0.00  0.00  0.73 
Turkey 
 
0.6  0.00  0.00  0.46 
United States 
 
1.0  0.00  0.00  0.29 
         
 
 
Notes: Cost to employer = STW NRR x (Maximum Duration/28 months) x Degree of Experience Rating; Elasticity 
of hours to STW = (Max STW NRR over Min STW NRR)x(Max Hours Reduction - Min Hours Reduction); NRR is 
the net replace ment rate; Eligibility criteria includes minimum hours reduction larger than 10%, provision of 
justification of economic need, social partner agreement and workers being eligible for UB; Entitlement criteria 
include compulsory training, recovery plan, no dismissal and job search requirement for employee; degree of 
experience rating is computed as STW cost for employer over total STW cost. 
Source: own calculations based on data from Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn, 2010 OECD Working Paper 
 
Table  3  documents  substantial  cross-country  differences  in  these  key  design  features  of 
STW. In terms of eligibility conditions, the least restrictive systems are those of Italy and 
New Zealand while the most restrictive are in North-America. Hungary, Netherlands, Poland 
and Spain are the most restrictive in entitlements rules. Two of the latter group of countries 
are also forcing employers to internalize more than 50 per cent of the costs related to the 
activation of the program in their firm. Notice that in a number of countries firms do not 
participate  at  all  in  the  costs  of  STWs    (Canada,  Finland,  Ireland,  Japan,  Korea,  Slovak 
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the US). Finally, Korea and Italy are the two countries 
where the replacement of the previous earnings offered by STW declines only very mildly 
with the scale of hours reductions preventing a strong reduction in take-home pay. More   15 
insights as to the German and Italian STW schemes, the two largest in terms of take-up 
rates, are offered in the boxes below. 
 
How do these features affect the demand for STW? 
 
The demand for STW is likely to be affected by the specific features of each STW scheme, 
notably the eligibility and entitlement conditions and the financial contribution requested to 
the employers making use of the programme or degree of experience-rating. The above 
theoretical  considerations  suggest  that  short-time  work  is  an  institution  which  could  be 
more popular and widely used in countries where the replacement rates offered by STW are 
only mildly declining with hours reductions. Institutional interactions are also important: 
strict  employment  protection  legislation  and  collective  bargaining  institutions  highly 
constraining downward wage adjustment should increase the demand for STW which are 
likely to be less widely used in presence of generous UB systems. 
  
Table 4 displays estimates of the STW take up rates (defined as programme participants over 
the  labour  force),  by  pooling  cross-country  and  (quarterly)  time-series  observations.  In 
particular, we investigate whether take-up rates are correlated with the strictness of EPL, 
the centralization of collective wage bargaining institutions, the generosity of UB, as well as 
with the design features of STW which were characterised above.  
 
The estimates are carried out by using quarterly observations from Q1 2003 to Q1 2010 
(whenever  available
3) over twenty countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Slovak  Republic,  Spain  and  Switzerland)  and 
controlling for macroeconomic conditions (captured by quarterly GDP growth rates). EPL, UB 
and the centralization indexes also vary across countries and over time (although only at 
yearly frequencies), while the STW design features, which were described above, have only a 
cross-sectional variation in that they capture the characteristics of these schemes at Q109
4  
   
                                                 
3 Original data are provided by Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn (2010 OECD) but have been extended by 
Cahuc and Carcillo (2011). 
4 Annex 2 displays results of a regression confined to Q109 to Q210 period. Results are broadly in line 
with those displayed in Table 4.   
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Table 4: Determinants of STW take-up rates -- Regression results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  STW take-up rate  
           
GDP Growth [t-1]  -0.139***  -0.139***  -0.177***  -0.186***   
  (0.0492)  (0.0527)  (0.0482)  (0.0538)   
Employment Protection Index    0.294**  1.035***  1.173***  1.416*** 
    (0.138)  (0.219)  (0.308)  (0.289) 
UB net replacement rate    -0.0179**  -0.0504***  -0.111***  -0.112*** 
    (0.00864)  (0.00997)  (0.0192)  (0.0177) 
Bargaining centralization index    0.346***  0.265***  0.484***  0.617*** 
    (0.0853)  (0.0762)  (0.0936)  (0.0886) 
Strictness of eligibility criteria      -1.395***  -0.0522  0.657 
      (0.379)  (0.646)  (0.607) 
Strictness of entitlement criteria      -6.200***  -4.566***  -6.240*** 
      (0.809)  (1.604)  (1.516) 
Cost to employer        -2.193*  -1.496 
        (1.145)  (1.066) 
STW net replacement rate        0.0468***  0.0462*** 
        (0.0144)  (0.0133) 
STW elasticity to hours        -0.811  -0.375 
        (0.570)  (0.520) 
Constant  0.874***  0.511  3.008***  2.561***  1.744** 
  (0.0692)  (0.501)  (0.545)  (0.811)  (0.861) 
           
Quarterly x Year Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
Observations  349  325  322  285  292 
R-squared  0.023  0.162  0.348  0.441  0.590 
Notes:  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *  denote  the  1%-,  5%-,  and  10%-significance  levels, 
respectively. Bargaining centralization index represents the dominant level(s) at which bargaining takes place 
(missing after 2007, we make the strong assumption that value for 2008 and 2009 does not change). It takes 
the following values: 
5 = national or central level 
4 = national or central level, with additional sectoral / local or company bargaining 
3 = sectoral or industry level 
2 = sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining 
1 = local or company bargaining 
Adding Strictness of eligibility criteria reduces the size of the sample because it is missing for Portgual; adding 
Bargaining Centralization Index reduces the size of the sample  because it is missing for Korea and Turkey; 
adding STW net replacement rate reduces the size of the sample because it is missing for Finland. 
 
Source:  own  calculations  on  data  from  Alexander  Hijzen  and  Danielle  Venn,  2010  OECD  Working  paper, 
extended by Cahuc and Carcillo (2011); EPL, UB nrr and GDP growth from OECD; Bargaining centralization index 
from Visser (2009). 
 
The  table  suggests  that  STW  is  not  an  institution  which  could  be  readily  extended  to 
countries with low employment protection. Generous unemployment benefit systems also 
tend  to  be  associated  with  relatively  low  take-up  rates,  although  this  correlation  is  not   17 
always statistically significant. Thus, flexicurity arrangements seem to be a substitute for 
STW. Decentralized wage bargaining structures can also reduce the demand for STW.  
 
Looking  at  the  design  features  of  STW,  higher  costs  for  employers  and  more  restrictive 
eligibility and entitlement conditions are associated with lower take-up rates. This is hardly 
surprising, but confirms that many details of these institutions should not be overlooked and 
that simple comparisons across countries, not acknowledging these differences in design 
may be quite misleading. The devil is very much in the details here. Another factor positively 
affecting the demand for STW is the net replacement of previous earnings being offered, 
which buys workers’ consensus to hours reductions. The responsiveness of STW to hours 
adjustment  is,  however,  not  significant,  albeit  this  is  an  admittedly  poor  proxy  for  the 
responsiveness of labour costs to wage adjustment. 
 
The effects implied by our estimates are quite sizeable. In order to give an idea of the 
magnitudes involved, the estimated coefficients imply that bringing Belgium to Germany in 
terms  of  eligibility  conditions  would  reduce  the  take-up  rate  by  1.9  percentage  points, 
halving  its  level  from  its  peak  of  4.4  during  the  Great  Recession.  Similarly  reducing  the 
replacement  rate of  Italy  to  the  levels  of  Austria  would  reduce the  take-up  rate by  1.3 
percentage points.  
 
 
Box 1: STW in Germany  
 
Short-time work has been widely applied in Germany to buffer economic shocks since the first oil price shock in 
1973. At present, the German system envisages three kinds of short-time work: 
  
1. Short-time work for economic reasons. The eligibility criteria for this type of STW is that a firms faces a 
temporary, unavoidable threat of losing employment due to economic factors or another unavoidable event 
(Social Code III, § 170). This type of STW is basically designed for adjustments in the course of the business 
cycle. About 90 per cent of STW in Germany referred to this category in 2009. 
2.  The  so-called  “Transfer-Kurzarbeit”,  for  firms  which  face  a  permanent  loss  of  employment  due  to 
restructuring measures at the firm level (Social Code III, § 216b). This type of short-time work was extensively 
used  in  Eastern  Germany  after  German  unification,  when  large  parts  of  the  industrial  sector  collapsed. 
Employees on “Transfer-Kurzarbeit” cannot be reemployed by the affected firm or by other affiliates of the 
enterprise  benefitting  from  the  transfers.  This  scheme  should  buffer  structural  adjustment,  but  cannot 
postpone it. 
3. Short-time work for seasonal workers (Social Code III, § 175) which is mainly used in the construction sector 
and other “outdoor” branches of the economy. STW benefits for seasonal workers are only granted in the 
period from December 1 to March 31. 
 
Employees are eligible to short-time work benefits if they contribute to social security and if their contract is 
not terminated. The reduction in working hours must imply an earning loss of at least 10 per cent. STW benefits 
are paid by the Federal Employment Services, which adds to the hourly wage times the hours worked which is 
offered by the firm a transfer enabling the worker to earn on the hours reduction a fraction of the hourly wage 
which is equal to the replacement rate offered by unemployment benefits. For an earner with one dependent 
child this replacement rate is 67 per cent, for an earner without dependents it is 60 per cent. 
 
A  firm  is  eligible  for  short-time  work  for  economic  reasons  if  it  claims  that  the  business  conditions  have 
temporarily deteriorated and that all other flexibility measures (e.g. reduction of overtime hours and working-
time accounts) have been already utilized. Before the Great Recession, it was also necessary that at least one-
third of the employees had been affected by an income loss of at least ten per cent due to the reduction of 
working hours. There also job search requirements like those applied to unemployment benefits recipients.  
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Firms participate in the costs of the reduced working hours via contributions to the social security system 
(pensions, health insurance unemployment insurance). Before the Great Recession, employers had to pay 80 
per  cent  of  the  social  security  contributions  for  the  working  hours  reduced.  Note  that  the  social  security 
contributions  of  employers  and  employees  reach  almost  40  per  cent  of  a  gross  salary  in  Germany.  Since 
February 1, 2009, 50 per cent of these costs of the firm for the working hours reduced are reimbursed by the 
Federal Employment services. Moreover, the Federal Employment Services reimburses 100 per cent of the 
costs if firms rely for more than 6 month on STW from July 1, 2009 to March 31, 2012. Finally, the Federal 
Employment Services covers also 100 per cent of the costs if the employees affected by STW participate in 
approved  training  measures.  Nevertheless,  only  about  20  per  cent  of  the  employees  affected  by  STW 
participate in those training measures. 
 
Figures A and B illustrate the cost of the program for an employer before and after the reform of the system, in 
case of an employee with a standard full-time contract and a gross salary of 3,000 EURO per month, which 
corresponds roughly to the average salary in Germany. The total amount of social security contributions is 
19,725  per  cent  for  the  employer,  so  that  total  labour  costs  amount  to  3,591.75  EUROs.  Social  security 
contributions of the employee amount to another 20,625 per cent for the employee or 618.75 EUROs. Under 
the old scheme, the employer had to pay 80 per cent of the total security contributions of the employer and 
the employee per each working hour reduced. In case of a reduction of 100 per cent of the working hours, this 
would leave the employer in our example with a cost of 968.4 EUROs or 27 per cent of the total labour costs of 
a full-time employed worker. After the reform, this cost is reduced to 482.4 EUROs or 13.2 per cent of the costs 
of a full-time worker.  
 
As shown by figure A, total costs per working hour increase disproportionally with hours reductions: under the 
old scheme, the firm has to pay 26 EUROs per hour instead of 23.3 EUROs per hour if it reduces the average 
working time by 30 per cent, 29.6 EUROs if it reduces it by 50 per cent and 646 EUROs if it reduces it by 99 per 
cent. Under the new scheme, the cost per working hour stands still at 335 EUROs if the working time is reduced 
by 99 per cent. Note that the average reduction of working hours of  firms which take-up STW has been 
reduced from 55 per cent before the Great recession to 34 per cent in the second quarter of 2010.  
 
   Figure A - Labour costs and STW              Figure B - Labour cost per hour and STW  
   
Source: Own calculation based on data from the German social security systems. See Crimman/Wiesner (2009) 
for similar calculations. 
 
Box 2: The Italian STW 
 
Italian short-time work scheme can be defined as a wage guarantee fund based on two main pillars, “Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria” (CIGO) and “Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria” (CIGS), and on a 
third  pillar  more  recently  introduced,  “Cassa  Integrazione  in  Deroga  (CIGD).  CIGO  is  applied  in  case  of  a 
temporary reduction of activities related to short-term problems. It covers blue and white-collar workers in 
construction and manufacturing sectors employed in firms with more than 15 employees and workers in the 
service sector of firms with more than 50 employees. CIGS covers a smaller range of sectors than CIGO. It deals 
with the restructuring of plants, reorganisation of production, prolonged crisis or bankruptcy procedures. It has 
a greater coverage of service sectors than CIGO. CIGD is aimed at extending the duration of CIGS or involving 
firms that are not covered. During the Great Recession, CIGD was temporarily extended to small and medium-
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contributions in the past to this scheme. Indeed, CIGD is paid out of General Government revenues. Often firms 
go through the entire sequence: CIGO, CIGS and then CIGD, which is paradoxically the least costly for the 
employer of the three. 
 
Both CIGO and CIGS are quite generous in principle as they are supposed to replace about 80 per cent of 
previous earnings. However, there is a rather low monthly ceiling (in 2009, maximum net amount was 840,81 
EUROs per month for workers with a monthly salary below 1.931,86 EUROs per month and 1.010,57 EUROs per 
month for workers with a higher salary). Notice that 5.84 per cent of this gross wage should be paid by the 
worker to social security. The maximum duration of CIGO is 12 months, while for CIGS it is 12 months in case of 
company crisis, 18 months for bankruptcy and 24 months in case of restructuring. In any case, CIGO and CIGS 
altogether cannot exceed a period of 36 months over 5 years. In principle participation to CIGO and CIGs is 
conditional on not refusing a suitable job and on attending training programmes, but this requirement is rarely 
enforced. 
 
In order to benefit from CIGO, CIGS and CIGD, prior consultation with trade unions is required: unions can 
interfere with decisions of firms not only about how many workers to put on the short-time work scheme, and 
on the extent of hours reductions, but also on the characteristics of the workers involved.  
 
Contributions paid by employers increase with the size of firms (1.90per cent of wages for firms with less than 
50 employees and 2.20 per cent for those with more than 50 employees). Moreover, companies using CIGO 
have to pay an additional contribution of 8 per cent of the wage supplement if they employ more than 50 
workers, 4 per cent if less. However, if the employer can prove that the reduction of working hours was due to 
exogenous  reasons,  this  experience-rated  component  is  not  applied.  Also  CIGS  involves  some  experience-
rating, but in the first 24 months it is lower (4.5 per cent or 3 per cent for companies with less than 50 
employees). This contribution increases to 9 per cent (6 per cent for small firms) after 24 months. Notice that, 
unlike in Germany, social security contributions are paid only for actual hours worked.  
 
Figures C and D illustrate respectively the total labour cost and hourly labour cost of participation of firms to 
CIGO. We consider an individual with no children earning the average production worker gross wage of 2.182 
EUROs per month, including social security contributions (OECD Taxing Wages 2008-2009). Since the employer 
has to pay no social security contribution for hours not worked, the cost is simply represented by the wage paid 
for the actual hours worked plus the experience-rated contribution, when required. Suppose hours worked are 
reduced by 50 per cent. In this case the employer pays 1,171 EUROs for the hours actually worked and a 
contribution of 80.85 EUROs for hours not worked (8 per cent of 1010.57 EUROs, the maximum STW payable 
by law). This corresponds to a cost of 14.65 EUROs per hour. If average working time is reduced by 99 per cent, 
the cost increases to 64.16 EUROs per hour. However, if the firm is exempted from experience-rating (as for 
most firms under CIGS under the Great Recession) hourly costs are flat in hours reductions at 13.64 EUROs and 
total costs can go all the way down to zero. In the case of the Cassa in Deroga, there is no cost for the employer 
for the hours of short-time work. Thus, unlike in Germany, there is a strong convenience for firms to bring 
hours of work all the way down to zero. During the Great Recession, the bulk of hours reductions occurred in 
CIGD. From accounting for less than 5 per cent of the total hours of STW, Cassa in Deroga had climbed to one 
third of the total hours of STW by February 2011 and was still rising six quarters after the end of the recession. 
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Source: own calculations based on information from the Italian National Institute of Social Insurance. 
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4.  An Evaluation 
 
4.1.  Responsiveness to Cyclical Conditions and Targeting 
 
As  we  have  seen,  STW  take-up  rates  are  strongly  affected  by  the  generosity  of  these 
schemes for the employer and partly also for the employees. Thus a high take-up rate may 
point to high fiscal costs, borne by the general taxpayer, and does not necessarily imply that 
the scheme is cost effective. 
 
As argued in Section 2, short-time work aims at counteracting the bias of labour adjustment 
towards  workers,  but  at  the  costs  of  inducing  an  inefficient  combination  of  hours  and 
employees. For this reason STW must operate temporarily to induce adjustments along the 
intensive margin in presence of transient shocks. If they are long lasting and are used to deal 
with structural redundancies, these schemes become a device to increase the duration of 
unemployment  benefits,  increasing  rather  than  reducing  the  fiscal  externalities  of 
employment adjustment. 
 
An additional reason for having STW operating only as a temporary shock absorber is that 
this institution obstructs restructuring associated with technological progress and structural 
change by freezing workers into low productivity jobs. As discussed in Box 3, this reduces 
longer term growth by making it more difficult to attain the productivity gains associated 
with the reallocation of workers from low-productivity to high productivity jobs. There are 
better instruments, such as unemployment benefits and subsidies to job creation, dealing 
with the long term process of technological change and creative destruction.  
 
 
Box 3: Job Reallocation and Short-time Work 
 
The long-run inefficiencies associated with a prolonged use of STW can be better understood by 
considering a dynamic model of the labour market with search frictions and gross job reallocation at 
the equilibrium job search. In this class of models, unemployment has a (socially) efficient function to 
play in selecting the most efficient units and in reducing congestion in the job openings market. 
Search  frictions  generate rents  for  employers  and workers,  which  are  split  –  in  the  tradition  of 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) – by a Nash bargaining rule. This wage setting regime implies that 
separations  are  always  jointly  privately  efficient  (for  the  employers  and  the  workers)  whenever 
match productivity falls below an endogenously determined reservation productivity threshold. This 
does not mean that they are socially efficient. In presence of a very strong bargaining power of 
workers  for instance, there can be more unemployment than socially optimal. Conversely a too 
strong bargaining power of employers may induce too little unemployment in that it becomes very 
difficult to fill vacancies when there are too few jobseekers around.  
 
Short-time work funded out of general Government revenues can be framed in this context as a 
transfer to firms experiencing negative shocks to productivity, conditional on keeping their jobs alive, 
and  funded  by  a  payroll  tax  on  highly  productive  firms.  The  effect  of  STW  is  isomorphic  to 
employment protection legislation in that it forces the reservation productivity below the levels that 
would prevail otherwise. STW reduces separations by lowering the outside opportunity of employers 
(who have to give up a subsidy in case the job is destroyed) and workers (who face lower job finding 
rates when unemployed). Notice that this result does not depend on the nature of the shock. The 
level of the reservation productivity is affected by the frequency of shocks, but STW reduces this   21 
reservation  productivity  independently  of  the  frequency  at  which  shocks  to  idiosyncratic  (or 
aggregate)  productivity  occur.  In  other  words,  STW,  just  like  EPL,  is  a  labour  hoarding  device, 
reducing average labour productivity. As the value of a job for an employer is reduced by these 
institutions,  STW  negatively  affects  not  only  job  destruction,  but  also  job  creation  rates,  with 
ambiguous effects on unemployment. Thus, STW cannot remedy the social inefficiencies related to a 
suboptimal distribution of bargaining power between workers and employers. At the same time, the 
unambiguous effect of STW is that it reduces job reallocation.  
 
Suppose, for simplicity, that unemployment (employment) is the same with and without STW. It 
follows from the above that aggregate output is lower in presence of STW: there will be more low 
productivity and less high productivity jobs in this scenario than when this institution is not present. 
These dynamic inefficiencies associated with STW are even larger when we allow for technological 
progress embodied in new jobs (Caballero and Hammour, 1996). As new jobs start up being more 
productive than continuing jobs, institutions reducing job reallocation negatively affect economic 
growth. The policy implication is that policies trying to reduce unemployment should act on the job 
creation rather than on the job destruction margin. Subsidies to job creation are better suited than 
STW as they can reconcile the task of containing unemployment with that of increasing growth. 
 
Overall, there is no case for STW when consideration is made of the creative destruction processes 
associated with job reallocation. Subsidies to firms conditional on avoidance of job destruction are 
also bound to be ineffective in reducing unemployment except in presence of a temporary negative 
aggregate shock. A transient shock may make many jobs unviable inducing  a large  wave of job 
destruction. If the shock turns out to be temporary and STW are removed after the shock, than the 
effects of this measure on the job destruction margin will outpace those on job creation. Provided 
that  STW  is  also  temporary,  it  therefore  could  contribute  to  reducing  unemployment  during 
downturns. 
 
A case for STW can also be made in presence of rigid wages, preventing wages to be renegotiated in 
case of negative productivity shocks. Under wage rigidity, all separations are inefficient from the 
standpoint of the worker, who would therefore always vote for institutions postponing layoffs, even 
in presence of EPL. Employers would also favour the introduction of STW but only in presence of EPL, 
insofar as it prevents having a negative surplus in the job continuation region. Clearly, the support of 
individual employers would be stronger the less costly is STW, that is, the less this institution is 
experience-rated. 
 
Wage rigidity itself can be endogenized in this context, as done by Boeri et al. (2008) allowing for 
centralized  collective  bargaining  institutions  setting  floors  to  wage  bargaining  and  preventing 
adjustment of wages to idiosyncratic shocks. In presence of centralized wage bargaining, the crucial 
issue is how frequent are wage renegotiations. Indeed also collective bargaining institutions react to 
aggregate shocks -- such as an overall productivity decline, by allowing for some wage adjustment, 
which in turn reduces layoffs. The lower the frequency of bargaining, the greater is the role of STW. 
 
 STW in presence of rigid wages is therefore mainly a device to prevent or reduce the scope of 
downward  wage  adjustment  or  to  compensate  for  its  absence  in  case  of  negative  productivity 
shocks. There is a clear constituency supporting it, notably workers at the low productivity threshold. 
Employers would also favour STW when i. EPL is rather strict and ii. collective bargaining occurs at 
relatively low frequencies. Notice that the presence of wage rigidity by itself does not create a 
demand (of employers) for STW. It is the combination of wage rigidity and EPL that makes these 
schemes  desirable  for  employers.  Needless  to  say,  a  better  policy  in  this  context  would  be  to 
decentralize wage bargaining. 
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We consider below the performance in this respect of the Italian and German STW, the two 
largest schemes being operated in the OECD area and also those for which more information 
is available. As shown by Table 3 as well as Boxes 1 and 2, the two schemes have markedly 
different  design  features.  In  particular,  the  German  scheme  is  explicitly  designed  for 
temporary shocks, while the Italian system allows for STW in case of structural adjustment 
(Cassa Integrazione Straordinaria). German firms have to prove that the business situation 
has deteriorated temporarily, and have to contribute to the costs of each working hour 
reduction. This creates substantial incentives to adjust employment eventually, since hourly 
labour costs tend to increase with the utilization of Kurzarbeitergeld. In contrast, the Italian 
system  expanded  during  the  crisis  (Cassa  Integrazione  in  deroga)  is  paid  out of  General 
Government revenues; hence it is a sort of wage subsidy to the firm that has no incentives to 
reduce  STW.  Unlike  in Germany,  the  Cassa  Integrazione  in deroga  creates  also  a  strong 
incentive for employers to reduce hours of work all the way down to zero.  
 
Figure 4 displays estimates of the elasticity of take-up rates in manufacturing to changes in 
the index of industrial production (we focus only on this subset of sectors as we prefer to 
work  at  monthly  frequencies).  Elasticities  are  allowed  to  vary  over  time  as  they  are 
estimated  in  a  rolling  regression  over  a  4-year  (48  observations)  period.  95  per  cent 
confidence intervals are also displayed around the point estimates. Asymmetries between 
Germany and Italy are quite noticeable: in Germany the elasticity is between -.5 and -.7, that 
is, an increase by one per cent of the index of industrial production is associated with a .5 to 
.7 reduction in the take-up rate. In Italy instead the responsiveness of STW to the volumes of 
economic activity is not statistically different from zero except in the most recent periods 
and, in any event, it does not exceed .3 in modules, that is, it is less than half as sizeable as in 
Germany. 
 
Figure 4: Elasticity of take-up rates to Economic Activity 
Rolling Regressions – 48 months 
 
Notes:  displayed  coefficients  are  the  results  of  the  following  rolling  regression: 
, where STW is the number of hours of short-time work programmes in the 
industrial sector and IPI is the industrial production index 
 
Source:  for  Italy,  INPS  (Istituto  Nazionale  Previdenza  Sociale);  for  Germany,  Statistik  der  BA,  Zeitreihen  - 
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Table 5 looks at the sectoral and regional concentration of STW before (2007) and during 
(2009) the Great Recession. In particular it computes a standard measure of concentration, 
the Herfindahl index, across 19 sectors and the top 30 per cent to bottom 30 per cent ratio 
across 20 Italian regions and 15 German Länders (we use this measure as it is comparatively 
more meaningful when the size of regions is different across countries). Problems of cross-
country comparability arise also with respect to the sectoral Herfindahl index as the industry 
breakdown in take-up rates is somewhat different in Germany and Italy.  
 
With the above caveats in mind, Table 5 suggests that the sectoral concentration, which was 
relatively strong already in the 2005-7 period, increased by another 20 per cent in Italy 
throughout the Great Recession. Indeed a few sectors  (manufacture of fabricated metal 
products and textiles) together absorb almost 56 per cent of the total number of hours spent 
in the STW scheme. Also the geographic concentration increased as the first three deciles of 
the distribution of the regional population by incidence of the Cassa Integrazione displayed a 
take-up rate 3 times as large as the bottom four regions of this distribution, compared with 
1.5 before the Great Recession.  
 
Table 5: STW Concentration Indexes (full-time equivalents) 
   Herfindahl Index (sector) 
Regional Concentration  
(top-30% to bottom-30% ratio) 




















Notes: Coefficient of variation of percentage change of valued added by sector in 2007 and 2009 (
a2008 for 
Germany) and of regional GDP decline in 2007 and 2009 in parentheses. 
The Herfindahl index is computed over 19 sectors. Classification is not exactly the same for the two countries, 
but efforts have been made in order to harmonize data. Both sectoral and regional concentration indexes are 
computed with respect to total hours spent in STW 
 
Source:  for  Italy,  INPS  (Istituto  Nazionale  Previdenza  Sociale);  for  Germany,  Statistik  der  BA,  Zeitreihen  - 
Zeitreihe Kurzarbeiter in Deutschland. Regional GDP for Italy, ISTAT, and valued added from Eurostat. 
 
 
The situation is quite different in Germany as here the sectoral concentration did not change 
over time, while the regional concentration increased but less than in Italy. Importantly, 
output falls by region were more concentrated in Germany than in Italy (see the coefficients 
of variation displayed in brackets in table 5), while in Italy the dispersion of sectoral value 
added growth actually decreased since the beginning of the Recession.  
 
Overall it would seem that the German Kurzarbeit scheme is better designed than the Italian 
Cassa Integrazione as it is strongly countercyclical and less concentrated during recessions. 
Indeed  in  Germany  the  take-up  rate  increased  to  up  to  5.4  per  cent  in  May  2009  and 
subsequently declined to 2.3 per cent in April 2010 while in Italy it was still on the rise In 
January 2011, six quarters after the trough of the recession.  
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4.2.  Did STW save jobs during the Great Recession?  
 
A key issue in evaluating STW relates to the number of jobs which were potentially saved by 
these  schemes  during  the  Great  Recession.  It  is  clearly  very  difficult  to  evaluate  the 
counterfactual, that  is, employment adjustment  in  the  absence of  STW.  This  problem  is 
compounded by the fact that STW, as we have seen, is much different from country to 
country.  
 
We provide below two set of estimates of the jobs saved by STW. The first draws on macro 
estimates of the responsiveness of employment to changes in STW take-up rates. It has the 
advantage  of  capturing  general  equilibrium  effects  of  STW,  but  clearly  at  the  costs  of 
accuracy.  In  particular,  due  to  a  paucity  of  observations,  we  cannot  provide  separate 
estimates for the individual countries and we already know from Section 3 how different 
short-time  work  schemes  are  from  country  to  country.  There  is  also  a  problem  of 
endogeneity as STW take-up rates are themselves affected by employment-unemployment 
developments. Unlike previous studies, however, we instrument take-up rates in order to 
make causal inferences about the relationship between STW and employment.  
 
The second set of estimates is based on micro evidence on establishment-level employment 
adjustment  in  Germany,  drawing  on  the  IAB  establishment  panel.  This  second  set  of 
estimates does not take into account the effects of STW on job creation pointed out by the 
literature, nor of potential fiscal spillovers, but controls for the characteristics of firm using 
STW. It also uses firm-level instruments to identify causal effects of STW. 
 
4.2.1. The Macro Approach 
 
In the macro approach we estimate the following equation in all countries for which we have 
a quarterly series on employment, value added and STW take-up rates  
 
  (5) 
 
where de and dy denote the log difference of employment and output respectively while 
STWR stands for take-up rates of short-time work (employees at reduced hours over total 
dependent employment, the longest take-up series available) and EPL is the OECD index of 
employment protection. The two key coefficients are in this context   and  . The former 
measures  the  contribution  of  STW  to  employment  variation  when  there  is  zero  output 
growth.  The  second  coefficient  captures  the  way  in  which  short-time  work  affects  the 
elasticity of employment variation to output changes.  
 
Table 6 displays the results of this regression. The first column is estimated via OLS, while 
the  second  uses  as  instruments  the  time  elapsed  since  the  first  introduction  of  a  STW 
scheme in any given country or a subsequent reform  of this program (the instruments are 
the log of the number of quarters since the reform up to the next reform). The identification 
assumption is that there is a learning process about the new rules which affects take-up 
rates, but not directly the adjustment of employment to output changes. 
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Table 6: Regression Results 
  Dep. Variable: Delta (dependent) employment 
  (1)  (2) 
  OLS  IV (2sls) 
     
GDP Growth  0.177***  0.187*** 
  (0.0304)  (0.0331) 
Employment Protection   0.778  0.635 
  (0.604)  (0.609) 
STW take-up rate  -0.114**  -0.194** 
  (0.0595)  (0.0877) 
GDP Growth x STW take-up rate  -0.051*  -0.074* 
  (0.0305)  (0.0434) 
Constant  -0.602  -0.402 
  (0.889)  (0.895) 
     
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
     
     
Observations  557  519 
R-squared  0.212  0.208 
Notes:  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  *  denote  the  1%-,  5%-,  and  10%-significance  levels, 
respectively. Our instruments count quarters since the STW introduction and become zero when a new reform 
takes place; all the instruments are significant in the first stage regression. 
 
Source: OECD   
 
In both specifications we find that our parameters of interest,   and  , are negative and 
statistically significant. The IV estimates are always larger in modules, which is in line with 
the idea that employment growth negatively affects take-up rates. Both the OLS and the IV 
estimates  imply  that  STW  contributes  to  reducing  dis-employment  only  in  presence  of 
sizeable output falls. In the case of the instrumental variable estimates, the decline of GDP 
should be larger than 2.6 per cent for STW to prevent job losses. The non-monotonic effects 
of STW on employment adjustment to output are visually characterized in Figure 5 which 
also displays 95 per cent confidence bands around our point estimates. We hold take-up 
rates constant at the cross-country average of 1.23 in our sample. However, we know from 
Section 3 that STW take up rates are themselves decreasing in output growth. Thus, it is 
quite unlikely that we could observe the unambiguously positive effect of STW on job losses 
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Figure 5 













Table  7  provides  an  estimate  of  the  jobs  potentially  saved  by  STW  during  the  Great 
Recession, by using the IV estimator and taking for each country the average take-up rate 
and the cumulative, peak-to-trough, GDP decline. Significantly the effect is always positive 
although in many cases it is almost negligible, and it is always lower than the total number of 
workers involved in the program, pointing to deadweight costs. Unsurprisingly we find the 
largest effects in the countries having experienced the deepest output falls, such as Ireland 
and Finland, in spite of the relatively small scale of the programmes in these countries.  
 






















Austria  0.41  -5.23  0.08  2,842  14,512  11.670 
Belgium  4.73  -4.28  0.59  22,535  179,203  156.668 
Canada  0.13  -3.30  0.01  1,000  28,942  27.942 
Czech Republic  1.46  -4.92  0.25  10,558  60,084  49.526 
Finland  1.07  -10.10  0.60  13,023  22,023  9,000 
France  0.49  -3.93  0.05  11,067  122,167  111,067 
Germany  0.77  -6.76  0.24  82,725  259,645  176,920 
Hungary  0.25  -8.11  0.10  3,506  14,803  11,297 
Ireland  0.60  -15.14  0.56  9,469  9,645  176 
Italy  1.58  -6.95  0.51  89,416  274,239  184,823 
Japan  0.04  -8.93  0.02  10,011  21,182  11,171 
Luxembourg  0.37  -5.31  0.07  137  681  544 
Netherlands  0.28  -5.44  0.06  4,500  37,577  33,077 
Portugal  0.02  -3.89  0.00  67  2,763  2696 
Spain  1.02  -4.98  0.18  30,400  160,572  130,172 
Switzerland  0.57  -3.36  0.03  1,136  22,634  21,498 
 
Notes:  The third columns displays the product   according to IV estimates, while the 
fifth multiplies this by the number of employees in 2008Q4, before the beginning of the dis-employment 
process. The average STW take-up rate is computed only over the recession quarters, i.e. the same period over 
which we compute cumulative GDP decline. 
 
output fall 
Jobs saved (%) 
-2.6%  -5%  -0.22%   27 
 
Unfortunately, the limited number of observations does not allow us to recover parameter 
estimates for each individual country. Applying the same coefficient to all countries may bias 
downward our estimates of the jobs saved for the countries with more efficient STW and 
upwards those for the countries with rather ineffective schemes in place.  
 
4.2.2  The Micro Approach  
 
The evidence provided in the previous sections draws on aggregate figures at the national, 
regional and sectoral level. In this section we use firm-level data from Germany to gain 
additional insights as to the effects of STW during the Great Recession. Although Germany is 
one of the OECD countries which applied STW benefits at a larger scale during the Great 
Recession, there are also other mechanisms which facilitated the adjustment at the intensive 
margin.  One  of  these  instruments  is  working-time  accounts  (WTAs).  They  are  flexible 
arrangements where employees receive a credit for over-time working hours, which can be 
used  later  on  to  reduce  working  time  or  acquire  additional  holidays.  Analogously,  if 
employees work fewer hours than established in the contract, there is a debt which has to 
be balanced later. Thus, working-time accounts enable firms to smooth the working time 
over  the  business-cycle  without  additional  costs  which  are  for  example  due  in  case  of 
overtime-work (see Bellmann and Gerner 2010 for details). While the full-time equivalent of 
STW benefits amounted to 360,000 jobs in Germany in 2009, the reduction on overtime 
working hours between 2008 and 2009 was equal to 285,000 full-time equivalents and the 
change  in  the  balance  of  the  working-time  accounts  amounted  to  244,000  full-time 
equivalents (Möller 2010). Since short-time work benefits and working-time accounts might 
be substitutes in the adjustment at the intensive margin, we shall consider also the effects of 
working-time accounts. 
 
Our microeconomic estimates draw on data from the 2009 IAB establishment panel (IAB 
Betriebspanel)  in  Germany.  The  IAB  establishment  panel  is  an  annual  survey  of 
approximately 16,000 firms which covers about 1 per cent of all firms and 7 per cent of the 
employees in Germany (cf. Fischer et al., 2009, and Kölling, 2000, for a description). The 
question on the utilisation of STW was asked in the 2003, 2006 and 2009 waves of the 
survey.
5 Information on working-time accounts (WTA) is available in the 1999, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008 and 2009 waves.
6  Firm information include turnover and profitability in the 
previous year, revenue expectations in the current year, labour turnover and the skill 
composition of the workforce as well as institutional features such as the structu re of 
collective bargaining, the presence of worker councils, the use of fixed -term and other 
temporary contracts and the incidence of temporary agency work. 
 
Previous literature, based on the same database has looked at the question whether the use 
of Kurzarbeit is associated with an adjustment to economic shocks at the intensive margin. 
Based on the 2003 wave of the survey, Deeke (2005) provides descriptive evidence that 
firms which apply short-time work schemes display less employment volatility (measured in 
                                                 
5 The question asked is as follows: “Did you use short-time work during the 1
st half year of 2009?” If yes:  “How many 
employees were on short-time work?” 
 
6 The question asked is as follows: „Are there working-time accounts in your firm/establishment?” If yes: “Please estimate: 
What is the percentage of employees participating in this scheme?”       28 
terms of labour turnover) than firms which did not use STW. Crimann et al. (2010) find a 
negative  correlation  between  firms  using  Kurzarbeit  and  the  utilization  of  temporary 
contracts, such as temporary agency work, freelancers and part-time workers. Moreover, 
Bellmann  and  Gerner  (2010)  find  ambiguous  evidence  on  the  role  of  STW  take-up  by 
comparing firms which use Kurzarbeit and those which do not: on the one hand, firms which 
use STW have reduced employment significantly in 2009 whether adversely affected by the 
crisis or not, while firms which do not use STW have reduced their employment only when 
they suffered from the crisis. The authors conclude that “the identification of a causal effect 
of (...) short-time work finally, is left for future research.” (Bellmann and Gerner, 2010, p. 
16). In other countries, Calavrezo et al. (2009) find a positive correlation between layoffs and 
STW in France, which might be traced back to the fact this study does not sufficiently control 
for the selection problem. A comprehensive study of the STW programmes in the United 
States carried out by Berkeley Planning Associates & Mathematica Policy Research (1997) 
find no clear-cut evidence. This report concludes that the findings suffer from selection bias 
such that further empirical work is needed (see also Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011, for a review). 
 
Our approach differs in two main respects from the previous literature. First, we use the 
panel structure of the dataset to identify whether the STW take-up is driven by variables 
which capture pre-crisis business conditions and structural problems of firms or by variables 
which capture current business conditions and expectations about the future. This provides 
new insights as to the question whether the take-up of STW is used to hinder employment 
adjustment to structural problems at the firm level predating the crisis. Given that the 2008 
wave of the IAB establishment panel took place in June 2008 and the 2009 wave one year 
later, the pre- and post crisis conditions are fully covered by the dataset. Secondly, we try to 
identify the impact of STWs and of WTAs on the employment adjustment of firms during the 
Great Recession using an instrumental variable approach which explicitly acknowledges the 
endogeneity of STW and of WTAs. 
 
4.2.2.1 Descriptive evidence 
 
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of firms which use STW and 
WTAs compared to those which do not for the crisis year 2009. According to the weighted 
figures of the IAB Establishment Panel, 4.8 per cent of the firms have taken-up STWs by the 
mid of 2009. On average, about 50 per cent of the workforce participates in firms which 
utilize STW. In total, 2.1 per cent of the workforce is covered by STW. At the same time, 
almost one-third of the firms had WTAs in place. Roughly one third of German employees 
(28 per cent) participated in WTAs in Germany by the mid of 2009. 
 
Firms which took-up STW had substantially more employees than the average firm, had a 
disproportionally high export share and a high level of research and development activity. 
The share of part-time workers and female workers of firms which utilized STW has been 
substantially below that of the average firm. This corresponds to the standard pattern in the 
manufacturing sector in Germany, which has been mainly affected by the Great Recession 
and, hence, participated disproportionally in STW. Interestingly enough, the share of fixed-
term contracts of firms which took-up STW has been below that of the average firm, while 
the share of temporary agency workers has been slightly above the average. Among the 
institutional features, we observe that a disproportionally large share of firms which utlise   29 
STWs have a worker council in place and a slightly higher share of these firms are led by a 
porofessional management compared to the sample average.  
 
Most striking is the fact that firms which utilized STW have been disproportionally affected 
by the Great Recession: almost two-thirds report that they expect a decline in revenues in 
the year 2009 compared to 28 per cent of the average firm. The average decline in revenues 
is expected to amount to 19 per cent in firms which took-up STW compared to 3.3 per cent 
in  the  average  firm.  Moreover,  firms  participating  in  STW  are  also  disproportionally 
represented among those which report a turnover decline in 2008, i.e. the year where the 
Great Recession has started:  40 per cent of the firms using STW report a turnover decline in 
2008 compared to 24 per cent in the sample average. Firms which take-up STW report also 
that they suffer more from competitive pressures.  
 
Interestingly enough, there seems to be no correlation between the take-up of STW and past 
business results at first glance: The profitability of firms which participate in STW has been 
similar to the average firm in the pre-crisis year 2007. Another interesting feature is that 
firms which use STW have reported more than proportionally that they suffered from labour 
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Table 8 - Characteristics of firms which take-up STW and use WTA, 2009 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the IAB Establishment Panel. All figures displayed are weighted. 
 
all
take-up STW use WTA firms
Expected Revenue Growth 2009
positive (in %) 7.8 18.9 16.7
unchanged (in %) 27.6 49.5 55.0
negative (in %) 64.6 31.6 28.3
average growth in % -18.9 -3.3 -3.3
High competitve pressure 2009 (yes in %) 55.8 40.8 39.8
Firm survival at risk 2009 (yes in %) 0.6 0.6 0.7
Turnover decline 2008 vs. 2007 (yes in %) 40.0 23.3 24.0
High competitive pressure 2008 (yes in %) 52.5 42.2 38.9
Labour shortages 2008 (yes in %) 52.9 43.4 33.8
Profitability in 2007
positive (in %) 75.0 76.9 73.2
zero (in %) 16.1 15.6 18.4
negative (in %) 8.9 7.4 8.4
Export share (in % of turnover) 10.9 4.0 3.0
High R&D activity (yes in %) 13.6 8.6 4.9
High technology standard (yes in %) 60.0 71.4 65.8
Education: share of workers with
no degree in % 22.6 19.9 20.1
vocational training degree in % 57.4 58.2 51.7
university degree in % 5.4 8.7 6.7
management/owners in % 14.6 13.2 21.6
Part-time workers (in %) 12.7 24.7 27.3
Temporary agency workers (in %) 14.6 14.6 7.2
Fixed-term contract workers (in %) 2.3 4.2 3.0
Female share (in %) 24.9 44.8 47.8
Firm dependency
independent firm (yes in %) 70.6 63.8 72.7
dependent affiliate (yes in %) 18.2 22.4 17.0
firm headquarter (yes in %) 10.4 10.6 7.9
other (in %) 0.8 3.2 2.4
Management structure
managed by owner (yes in %) 51.5 52.1 66.3
professional management (yes in %) 37.4 38.1 26.5
joint managment (yes in %) 11.1 9.8 7.2
Collective wage agreement (yes in %) 51.5 60.7 49.1
Worker council (yes in %) 45.3 47.3 31.3
Average number of employees 49.8 33.5 17.4
participation in STW and WTA
share of firms which take-up STW (in %) 100.0 7.7 4.8
share of firms which use WTA (in %) 51.8 100.0 32.1
share of employees on STW (in %) 49.4 3.4 2.1
share of employees on WTA (in %) 44.9 87.3 27.8
firms which …  31 
Firms which utilize WTAs share, by and large, the same characteristics as the average firm. 
Their expected revenues in 2009 are slightly above the average and the same is true for their 
profitability in the pre-crisis year 2007. Export-shares, R&D activity and the technology level 
of machinery and other equipment are also slightly above that of the average firm. The most 
striking  differences  to  the  sample  average  are  the  relatively  high  shares  of  fixed-term 
contracts  and  temporary  agency  workers.  This  seems  to  indicate  that  firms  which  use 
working-time accounts also seek flexible arrangements which facilitate the adjustment of 
employment at the extensive margin. Moreover, a larger share of firms which use WTA have 
worker  councils  and  collective  wage  agreements  in  place  than  the  sample  average. 
Particularly  the  first  finding  is  not  surprising  since  WTAs  are  usually  based  on  mutal 
agreements between worker councils and the firm management. 
 
Finally, there is a correlation between the utilization of WTA and STW take-up rates: Firms 
which use WTA have a disproportionally high STW take-up rate and a larger share of their 
workforce participates in STW compared to the average firm. 
 
4.2.2.2 The determinants of STW 
 
In  the  first  stage  of  our  econometric  analysis  we  explain  the  demand  for  Kurzarbeit  by 
regressing the STW take-up rate against variables which measure business shocks before the 
crisis and during the Great Recession, structural characteristics of the firm (export share, 
R&D  activities,  the  technological  level  of  machinery  and  equipment),  human  capital 
characteristics  of  the  workforce,  the  type  of  labour  contracts  (temporary  agency  work, 
temporary contracts) and institutional variables.  
 
The first column in table 9 presents the results of the regression of the short-time work take-
up  rate  against  structural  firm  characteristics.  This  indicates  that  a  high  level  of  R&D 
activities, a high export share, a large firm size and a high share of workers with a vocational 
training degree are positively correlated with the STW take-up rate. Moreover, the longer 




In  contrast,  firms  which  employ  state -of-the  art  machinery  and  technology  and  firm 
headquarters participate less in STW schemes. An intriguing finding is that contractual 
arrangements which facilitate an adjustment at the extensive margin, i.e. the share of 
temporary agency workers in a firm and the share of workers with a fixed-term contract are 
negatively correlated with the take-up of short-term benefits. The same holds true for the 
share of part-time workers. Regarding the skill structure of the workforce, we find that a 
higher share of workers with a university degree and a higher share of owners and managers 
in the workforce of a firm are negatively correlated with the STW take-up rate. However, we 
do not find a significant correlation between STW take -up rate and the way firms are 
managed (by owners or professional managers), collective wage agreements and some other 
firm features. The industry-level and regional level controls which are not displayed in table 
9 suggest that manufacturing firms use more short-time work benefits and that regions with 
                                                 
7 We have used the information on the take-up of STW in the 2003, 2006 and 2009 waves of the survey for 
constructing the experience variable. See our discussion of the STW experience variable as an instrument 
below for further details.   32 
a high concentration of export-oriented firms are over-represented among users of STW 
schemes. 
 
 Table  9 - Determinants of short-time work benefits 
 
Notes: Heteroscedastcity robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-
significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the short-time work participation rate, i.e. the share of 
short-time workers in the workforce of the respective firm. Each regression includes also firm size, industry and 
regional dummy variables. A list of the variables and their definitions is presented in Annex Table A5.  
 







NEGATIVE RESULT 07 0.003 (0.008)
POSITIVE RESULT 07 0.002 (0.005)
COMPET 08 0.012
*** (0.004)






































INDEPENDENT -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)
HEADQUARTER -0.013 (0.009) -0.015 (0.009) -0.014 (0.010)
OWNER 0.009 (0.008) 0.006 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008)










log empl. 2008 0.013
*** (0.006) 0.013





observations 9217 8936 8186
R
2 0.236 0.279 0.275
pre-crisis variables post-crisis variables
controls only and controls and controls  33 
The regression presented in the second column of table 9 considers also indicators for the 
business  conditions  in  the  pre-crisis  year  2007.  Interestingly  enough,  we  do  not  find 
evidence that a positive or negative business result in 2007 is correlated with the take-up of 
STW in 2009. This is a strong hint that structural problems of firms in the past have not 
affected  the  utilization  of  STW  during  the  Great  Recession.  However,  there  is  a  strong 
correlation between the competitive pressures a firm faced before the crisis and the take-up 
of STW in the crisis year. Labour shortages and problems with the recruitment of workers in 
the  past  do  not  affect  the  STW  take-up  significantly  in  2009.  The  effects  of  other  firm 
characteristics on the demand for Kurzarbeit are in the second regression very similar to 
those in the first one. 
 
Finally,  the  regression  displayed  in  the  third  column  of  table  9  considers  beyond  the 
structural firm characteristics also the current business conditions in the year 2009. Since 
turnover data and other business results for 2009 were not yet available by the mid of the 
year, we have to focus on expectations about the business results in the ongoing year. The 
main variable we use is the expected growth rate of revenues, which is the only continuous 
variable on business expectations for 2009 available in the survey. The results are striking: an 
increase in the expected revenues by one per cent reduces the STW take-up rate by 0.2 per 
cent. Similarly, a dummy variable which captures the turnover decline in 2008 turn out to be 
highly significant. Moreover, strong competitive pressures increase the STW take-up rate 
significantly. 
 
Overall, our regression results indicate that the STW take-up rates are mainly affected by 
contemporaneous or anticipated shocks rather than by long-lasting structural problems of 
the  firms.  Moreover,  the  negative  coefficients  for  the  temporary  agency  worker  and 
temporary  contract  variables  suggest  that  contractual  arrangements  which  facilitate 
adjustments at the extensive margin reduce the take-up of STWs significantly. This is in line 
with the macro results displayed in Section 3. Finally, STW seems to cover mainly workers 
with a vocational training degree. The demand for STW is lower in firms having a larger share 
of workers with a university degree or other professionals. 
 
4.2.2.3 The determinants of WTAs 
 
Table 10 presents our first-stage regression results on the determinants of working time 
accounts. The dependent variable is the share of the workforce participating in working time 
accounts in any firm. Firms which use WTAs have a high share of R&D actitivities, state-of-
the-art machinery and equipment and a high share of workers with a vocational training 
degree. Collective wage agreements and worker councils are also positively correlated with 
WTAs. There exist also a significant correlation between WTAs and the shares of fixed-term 
contract workers and temporary agency workers suggesting that firms which use WTAs also 
seek  for  instruments  which  enable  them  an  adjustment  at  the  extenbsive  margin. 
Interestingly  enough,  we  find  no  correlation  between  working  time  accounts  and  the 
business conditions in 2009, but a positive correlation between firm profitiability and WTAs 
in the pre-crisis year 2007. Finally, labour shortages and recruitment problems before the 
crisis turn out to be significant determinant of WTAs. 
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Table  10 - Determinants of working-time accounts 
 
Notes: Heteroscedastcity robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-
significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the working time account participation rate, i.e. the 
share of workers which participate in working-time account arrangements in the workforce of the respective 
firm. Each regression includes also firm size, industry and regional dummy variables. A list of the variables and 
their definitions is presented in Annex Table A5.  
 
 
Revenue growth 09 -0.035 (0.026)
DECLINE -0.009 (0.010)
RISK 0.002 (0.040)
COMPET 09 -0.005 (0.009)
NEGATIVE RESULT 07 0.010 (0.018)




















































OWNER -0.017 (0.017) -0.012 (0.018) -0.016 (0.019)










log empl. 2008 0.006 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013) -0.004 (0.014)
WTA experience 0.037
*** (0.001) 0.037
*** (0.001) .0378176   .
*** (0.002)
observations 8186 8936 8186
R
2 0.275 0.279 0.275
controls only
post-crisis variables
and controls and controls
pre-crisis variables  35 
4.2.2.4 How many jobs were „saved“ by STW?  
 
Identification of the causal effects of STW on employment adjustment requires finding one 
or  more  instruments  affecting  the  demand  for  STW  (and  WTA)  but  not  employment 
adjustment. Needless to say, finding proper instruments is not an easy task. We exploit the 
information on past experience with the utilisation of STW and WTAs in our survey for the 
construction of such an instrument. Since the Great Recession is by and large uncorrelated 
to previous business shocks in Germany, we assume that the experience in using STW affects 
its current take-up rate, but is not correlated with the employment decline in the crisis year 
2009. We use the information on STW take-up in the 2003 and 2006 waves of the survey for 
the construction of this variable. Note that the first-stage regression results indicate that this 
variable is strongly and significantly correlated with the STW take-up in 2009.
8  
 
In case of WTAs we proceed in a similar fashion. Although WTA participation rate is an 
exogenous variable at the time of the Great Recession, firms more vulnerable to cyclical 
fluctuations  (e.g.,  producing  durable  goods)  may  use  WTAs  more  than  others.  We  used 
therefore the questions on the utilisation of WTAs from the 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 
2008 waves of the survey to construct an experience variable. Unsurprisingly, this variable 
turns out to be highly significant in our first-stage regressions. 
 
                                                 
8 See the regression on the determinants of STWs in Table 9 and the first-stage regression results in Annex 
Table A6.   36 
Table 11 - Explaining the employment impact of short-time work benefits and working-
time accounts 
 
Notes: Heteroscedastcity robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-
significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the log change in the number of workers covered by the 
social security systems. Each regression includes also firm size, industry and regional dummy variables. A list of 
the variables and their definitions is presented in Annex Table A5.  
 
Table 11 presents the regression results. We estimated the impact of STW and WTAs first 
separately and then jointly. To ease the interpretation, we provide both the OLS estimates 
not controlling for STW endogeneity and regressions where take-up is instrumented based 
on  the  first  stage  estimation.  The dependent  variable  is the  change  in  the  logarithm  of 
employment of workers covered by the social security system in June 2009 compared to 
June 2008.
9 The main explanatory variable is the number of short-time workers as a share of 
all employees in the first two regressions displayed in Table 11. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-
statistics and the first-stage regressions presented in Table A6 indicate that our instrument is 
                                                 
9 Note that only to workers covered by the social security system are eligible to receive STW benefits (see Box 
on Germany for details). 















































** (0.015) 0.014 (0.020) 0.040
** (0.015) 0.042
** (0.042) 0.034
** (0.015) 0.017 (0.019)
HIGH R&D 0.017
** (0.008) 0.005 (0.011) 0.018
** (0.008) 0.016
* (0.016) 0.008








Education 2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Education 3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000

















































MANAGEMENT -0.006 (0.009) -0.009 (0.009) -0.008 (0.009)
COLLECTAGR -0.004 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) -0.009 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006)







observations 7969 7969 8053 8031 7920 7920
R
2 0.166 0.126 0.167 0.164 0.166 0.128
Instrumental STW experience;
Variables STW experience WTA experience WTA experience









STW only WTA only STW and WTA
OLS IV OLS IV  37 




The results from the OLS regression  indicate that the STW take-up rate is significant at the 
one per cent level, although the coefficient is  rather small (0.07). In the IV-regression the 
coefficient increases to 0.37 and remains significant at the 5 per cent level.  In other words, 
increasing the share of short-time workers by one per cent raises employment by about 0.37 
per cent. The 95 per cent confidence interval for the parameter is however pretty large: it 
varies from 0.04 to 0.7. 
 
The third and the fourth columns in table 11 present our estimates of the effects of WTAs. 
Again, the regression diagnostics suggests that the IVs are not weak. The coefficient on the 
participation rate in WTAs is 0.018 in the OLS regression which does not control for potential 
endogeneity, and 0.051  in the  instrumented  regression. The latter result suggests that 
increasing the participation of the workforce in WTAs by one per cent increases employment 
by 0.051 per cent. The 95 per cent confidence interval of the coefficient varies between 0.01 
and 0.09. 
 
Finally, the fifth and the sixth columns present the results of our regression which include 
the STW tape-up rate and the WTA participation rate jointly. The regression diagnostics 
again indicates that our instruments are  rather strong. The coefficients on th e two main 
explanatory variables turn out to be significant in both the OLS and the IV regressions and 
their scale is similar to that in the separate regressions. In the OLS regressions we find a 
coefficient of 0.07 for the STW -take-up rate and of 0.017 fo r the WTA participation rate. 
These coefficients increase in the IV-estimates to 0.35 for STW take-up and to 0.042 for WTA 
participation.  
 
Given an average full-time equivalent of short-time work of about 40 per cent by the mid of 
2009, the point estimate for the STW-take-up rate suggests that the number of jobs saved is 
at 35 per cent only slightly below the full-time equivalent of STW. For the crisis year 2009, at 
an average number of 1.147 million short-time workers, our point estimate implies that the 
STW scheme saved about 400.000 jobs. At the same time it would suggest that there are 
only small deadweight costs associated to STW, that is, all hours of STW are indeed used to 
avoid redundancies rather than to finance hour reduction that would have occur red in any 
event. However, these findings have to be taken with caution, since the IV estimates imply 
that the 95 per cent confidence interval for the coefficient lies in a range between 0.03 and 
0.67. This would correspond to a range between 34.000 and 770.00 jobs which are saved by 
short-time work benefits. 
 
Analogously, our regression results imply that increasing the participation in WTA by one per 
cent increases the number of jobs by 0.04 2 per cent. At a participation rate of 28 of the 
workforce and 27.5 million workers covered by the social security system in Germany, this 
would imply that the WTAs would have saved about 320.000 jobs in 2009. This is slightly 
                                                 
10 We cannot test for overidentification since the equation is exactly identified. As a robustness check, we have used a 
second instrument (membership in a chamber of commerce of crafts). The Hanson-J-staticts does not reject the Null of no 
overidentification in this case. However, since our first-stage regression show that chamber membership is weak 
instrument, we present the exactly identified model here.   38 
higher  than  the  full-time  equivalent  of  the  change  in  the  balance  of  the  working-time 
accounts in Germany in 2009. Needless to say, also these results have to be interpreted  
cautiously since our parameters are not estimated very precisely and the results of the IV-
estimates might be biased. The range of the 95 per cent confidence interval is between 
62.000 and 616.000 jobs which are saved by WTAs in the course of the Great Recession. 
 
Overall, the microeconomic results are rather encouraging as to the effectiveness of STW 
and WTAs. However, the results are dependent on the validity of the instruments being 
used.  
 
5  Summary and Policy Implications  
 
Short-time work schemes are getting increasingly popular among policy-makers and opinion 
leaders notably in those countries that so far made little use of STW. This paper aims at 
providing a balanced view of this set of measures disentangling myths from reality. We offer 
below an account of our key findings and indicate ways to have a more informed debate 
about the role of STW. 
 
The rationale for STW is that firms are more likely to adjust the number of workers rather 
than the working hours in case of temporary shocks to demand. This is inefficient as workers 
are  risk-adverse  and  there  are  fiscal  externalities  associated  to  layoffs  in  presence  of 
unemployment benefit systems. This does not necessarily imply that state intervention is 
needed as these costs could be also internalized if bargaining is decentralized and work 
sharing agreements exist. However, failures in collective bargaining or liquidity constraints of 
firms may prevent the provision of flexible worksharing agreements at the decentralized 
level. Moreover, macro models suggest that STW benefits may serve as a device to prevent 
wage  deflation.  However,  STW  schemes  also  may  involve  inefficiencies:  employers  and 
employees  may  collude  in  extracting  state  transfers  even  if  firms  are  no  longer  facing 
negative demand shocks. In addition, a prolonged use of STW may prevent to enjoy the 
productivity gains resulting from workers reallocation from less to more productive jobs. The 
design features of STW benefit systems are crucial in dealing with these issues.   
 
Our results suggest that STW schemes are highly differentiated across countries along some 
key dimensions, such as eligibility criteria, entitlement conditions and costs to the employer 
at  different  percentages  of  hours  reductions  and  that  these  design  features  matter  in 
affecting take-up rates. Thus, the relevant policy issue is not whether or not to have a STW in 
place, but which type of STW, if any, should be adopted. After all, most OECD countries 
already have, by now, some form of STW in place. 
 
We  also  found  that  the  demand  for  STW  is  correlated  with  the  relevance  of  other 
institutions  dealing  with  redundancies.  In  particular,  the  demand  for  STW  is  lower  in 
“flexicurity  countries”,  displaying  less  strict  employment  protection  and  generous 
unemployment benefits. The low take-up rate of the US STW scheme is also likely to be due 
to the weak employment protection provided in this country. In order to increase take-up 
rates significantly in countries with mild employment protection legislation, the state will 
have to heavily subsidise STW schemes. This circumstance is generally ignored by many 
debates,  notably  in  the  US,  about  the  desirability  of  enhancing  STW.  Another  key   39 
institutional  feature  affecting  the  demand  for  STW  is  the  centralization  of  collective 
bargaining. In countries with decentralized bargaining structures there is a lower demand for 
STW perhaps because firm-level agreements can span over hours, employment and wages 
unlike national agreements that can meaningfully negotiate only over pay. 
 
From a normative standpoint, we find that the presence of job search requirements, the 
participation of employers in the costs of STW benefits  and the fact that the scheme is 
funded  entirely  via  contributions  of  employers  and  employees  improve  the  cyclical 
properties of STW. In particular, the relatively high involvement of firms in the financing of 
STW in Germany reduced incentives to use STW to cope with structural problems rather 
than temporary declines in demand. This is consistent with the steep decline of STW take-up 
rates in the course of the economic recovery in Germany as well as by our firm level analysis 
which shows that the pre-crisis business conditions are not correlated with the STW take-up 
in 2009. Altogether the German Kurzarbeit scheme appears to be superior to the Italian STW 
scheme (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) both in reacting to changes in business conditions 
and  in  not  being  concentrated  on  sectors  and  firms  facing  structural  redundancies,  a 
polarisation in the use of short-time work which may simply postpone unavoidable job and 
worker reallocations. 
 
We also evaluate the role played by STW in containing job losses during the Great Recession, 
the  key  factor  behind  the  current  popularity  of  STW.  The  macro  estimates  point  to 
significant deadweight costs as the number of jobs saved is always smaller than the number 
of full-time equivalents involved in the schemes. The micro estimates for Germany (435.000 
jobs saved) are, however, rather encouraging as they point to mild deadweight costs. The 
partial discrepancy between macro and micro results can be explained by the fact that in the 
macro estimates we can only partly control for cross-country differences in the design of 
STW and hence we can only identify the impact of an average STW scheme across the wide 
spectrum  of  national  schemes.  Another  possible  interpretation  for  the  higher  numbers 
found in the  micro  estimates  is  that the  latter  do not take  into account  of  the  general 
equilibrium effects of STW. As indicated by the body of theoretical literature reviewed in this 
paper, STW acts also on the job creation margin by reducing hiring rates and this may at 
least partly offset the effects of STW on employment along the job destruction margin.  
 
Our estimates take policy endogeneity into account, that is, the fact that STW take-up rates 
increase  when  business  conditions  deteriorate.  Indeed,  estimates  controlling  for  reverse 
causality imply a higher contribution of STW in containing job losses than estimates not 
controlling for the effects of employment adjustment on take-up rates.  
 
The  econometric  results  indicate  that  STW  can  be  effective  only  in  presence  of  severe 
recessions.  Under  milder  recessions  and  during  upturns,  STW  can  actually  increase 
employment losses. Thus, it is very important that STW is made responsive to changes in 
macroeconomic  conditions.  Experience-rating  and  co-financing  by  the  employers  of  a 
significant share of the costs of the instrument are very important in this respect.  Some 
consideration should also be made to accompanying STW with policies easing the hiring 
margin. Wage insurance scheme allowing workers moving across firms as well as from STW 
to new jobs to be compensated for the wage losses initially experienced in this job-to-job 
shift could be useful to reduce these effects of STW on the hiring margin.    40 
 
Another crucial policy issue relates to the financing of STW. We have argued above that STW 
works better when employers internalize the costs of these schemes. At the same time, high 
costs for employers reduce take-up rates and may end-up increasing the tax burden on firms 
just at a time where they need to be encouraged to hire more. One possible way out of this 
problem  is  to  let  average  contribution  rates  to  increase  during  upturns  allowing  to 
accumulate  a  surplus  of  the  fund  which  could  then  be  used  to  finance  a  reduction  in 
contribution rates during downturns.  
 
A  final  relevant  policy  issue  concerns  the  coverage  by  STW  of  temporary  work.  Some 
Governments reacted to the crisis by formally extending the coverage of STW to fixed-term 
contract holders. While this reform remedies to one of the most long-lasting discrimination 
in the legal treatment of temporary and permanent workers, the extension did not prove 
particularly successful. The issue is that STW are only marginally used to provide incomes to 
temporary workers during downturns and there is no evidence, even when drawing on micro 
data, that STW reduced job losses among temporary workers. The institutional interactions 
highlighted in our paper suggest that the negative correlation between STW take-up and the 
share of fixed-term contracts is likely to be due to the low employment protection provided 
to these workers. Employers have just no incentives to use STW for them when they know 
that these workers can be fired at will at the expiration of their contract. The problems of 
the dualism between temporary and permanent contracts have to be addressed by other 
reforms, such as the graded employment security scheme presented in previous issues of 
Economic Policy.  
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ANNEX 1: The bias toward workers of employment adjustment  
 
Consider that the supply of hours of work is given by   where   over the relevant 
wage. Cost minimization of (2) subject to (3) involves that 
 
  (6) 
 
where first order conditions are:  
 
i.   
ii.   
iii.   
 
and   is the elasticity of the wage function with respect to hours of work. Taking 
the ratio between i. and ii. and solving for h, we obtain 
 
  (7) 
 
Substituting this into the condition iii., we obtain an expression for the (conditional) demand 
of workers 
  (8) 
It follows that  
 
  (9) 
 
  (10) 
 
that is, the demand for hours is independent of the scale of production, while the demand 
for workers is dependent. 
Notice  further  that  the  responsiveness  of  the  demand  of  workers  to  output  change  is 
increasing in the elasticity of output to workers   and decreasing in fixed costs (F), while it 
is increasing in the elasticity of the wage function with respect to hours of work. See on this 
Garibaldi (2006). 

















Duration extended (from 3 to 6 months) 
Combined with specific training grants 
June 2009  September 2009 
Duration extended to 24 months (up to the end of 2012) 
SSC refunded by PES from the 7th months onwards 





Temporay increase of compensation. Permanent extension 
to temporary agency workers and workers with fixed-term 
contracts  who  worked  more  than  3  months  in  the 
enterprise 
Benefit of blue collar increase up to 70% of reference wage 
for a cohabiting employee and 75% for persons living alone 
April 2009    
Additional measure for reduction working-time,  whereby 
the employment contract of white-collar workers can be 
partially or fully suspended, for a maximum duration of 26 
or 16 weeks 
       
Canada  March 2009 
 
Duration extended by 14 weeks and access to the work-
sharing  programme  is  facilited.  Paper  burden  for 
employers is reduced 






Wage  supplement  for  employees  whose  working  hours 
have been reduced  
Conditional to participation in training programmes 
           
Denmark  March 2009     More flexible access to work-sharing 





Wage  supplement  for  employees  whose  working  hours 
have been reduced (effective until January 2011) 













May 2009  Increase in benefits  
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Germany 
Autumn 
2008   
Extended period of eligibility (12 to 18 months) 
May 2009  1 July 2009 
Extended period of eligibility (18 to 24 months) 
SSC reimbursed to employers by the local employment agencies 
Simplified application procedure and less stringent conditions 
           
Hungary    
Implemented 
until half 2010. 
Employers are reimbursed social security contributions and up 
to two times the minimum wage for hours not worked for a 
specified period up to 12 months in all schemes. 
Training costs (if applicable) are also supported. 
           
Japan  April  2009    
Eligibility extended to all workers covered by insurance 
regardless of the length of coverage 
Maximum duration extended from 150 to 300 days 
For large corporations, subsidy raised from 67% to 75%, while 
for SMEs, improved from 80% to 90% 





Coverage of the programme temporarily extended to small and 
medium-sized  firms  in  the  tertiary  sector,  including  retail 
companies with more than 50 employees, tourist agencies and 
operators with more than 50 employees and security companies 
with more than 15 employees. 





Training to employees whose working hours have been reduced 
to at least 20 hours per week 
Employee receives a scholarship of 70 LVL per month. Training 
courses last a maximum of 6 months. 
           
Lithuania  April 2009    
Possibility to combine STW and public works. Local PES can pay 
up  to  100%  of  remuneration  for  public  works  (based  on  the 
minimum hourly wage) and reimburse the associated SSC 
Training grant amounting to up to 70% of the minimum monthly 
wage is available 
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2008 until 21 
March 2009 
Temporary  reduced  working  time  scheme.  Initially  lasting  for  6 
weeks, it could be extended 3 times for up to 24 weeks. For any 
hours  lost,  employees  received  75%  of  their  last  earned  wage 
during the first 2 months of the scheme and 70% of their last wage 
for any hours lost thereafter. 
Eligible companies must meet a number of requirements (fall in 
sales of 30% over two months, training obligations, employment 
contracts  not  to  be  terminated  until  at  least  4  weeks  after  the 




Until April 2010 
Introduction  of  Partial  Unemployment  Benefits  replacing  the 
previous  scheme.  It  enables  employers  to  reduce  the  working 
hours of employees by a maximum of 50%. The initial request for 
partial  unemployment  benefits  can  cover  a  period  of  13 
consecutive  weeks  (or  3  months).  An  extension  can  be  applied 
twice and two extra periods of 26 weeks (6 months) of benefits can 
be granted. As a result, partial unemployment benefits can be used 
for a maximum of 65 weeks. 
Each company can participate to this scheme, given a number of 
obligations (agreement with trade union representatives; training 
agreements; penalties in case of dismissals within 3 months from 





More restricted  version of Partial UB. Eligible if  working time is 
reduced by a minimum of 20% for at least 6 months. Moreover, 
the  more  employees  are  taking  part  in  the  STW  scheme,  the 
shorter  the  time  period  the  employee 
is able to take part in the scheme. 





Working  time  of  employees  may  be  reduced  by  up  to  50%  of 
normal working time for a period of up to 6 months. Employers can 
then  apply  for  temporary  state  assistance  coving  part  of  the 
employees’ remuneration. 
Employers  can  also  implement  a  temporary  shut-down  for  a 
maximum of 6 months. Employees receive a benefit equivalent to 
the minimum wage. 
           
Portugal     2009 - 2010 
A  short-time  work  scheme  already  exists  (since  1983).  Training 
opportunities for up to six  months during periods of temporary 
reduction  in  normal  work  or  a  suspension  of  employment 
contracts. The financial support corresponds to 85% of the wage 
compensation payment as set out in the Labour Code. Incentives 
for  a  qualification,  up  to  maximum  1/3  of  the  normal  gross 
compensation  of  the  worker.  The  financial  support  applies  to 
maximum 20% of the workers of the enterprise. 
           
Romania    
Second quarter 
of 2009. Then 
prolonged until 
end 2010. 
Working  hours  reduction  schemes  already  exist  in  case  of 
temporary break of activity (so-called "technical unemployment"). 
Introduction of an exemption for a period of up to three months of 
the  payment  of  SSC  payable  by  both  employers  and  employees 
during temporary interruption of the activity. 
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Slovakia    
March 2009 until 
December 2010 
 
Temporary measure called "Contribution to support maintenance of 
employment". Following approval of the Labour Office, employers 
that reduce normal weekly working hours of their employees and 
continue to pay compensations at above 60% of the original wage, 
receive financial support corresponding to SSC paid by the employer 
and  the  employee  for  hours  not  worked  up  to  339  €/month  for 
maximum 60 days in the calendar year. 
1 March 2009 until 30 
December 201 
 
Introduction of “flexi-account”. For serious operational reasons, the 
employer, upon agreement with the trade union organisation, may 
give the employee time off for which the employee is entitled to a 
wage at an amount of at least the basic wage. Once the obstructions 
to work cease on the part of the employer, the employee is obliged 
to  work  extra  hours  for  the  time  off  that  was  provided  without 
claiming the wage as that had been provided when he was off work. 







Subsidy scheme for reduced working hours. The scheme is available 
to employers who reduce working time of their employees from 40 
hours  per  week  to  32-36  hours  under  certain  conditions  (no 
redundancies due to business reasons, continue to pay salaries and 
SSC, no overtime work and no management bonuses). The subsidy 
is  paid  for  a  maximum  of  6  months,  with  the  possibility  of 
prolonging it, upon formal request, for up to further 6 months. 
Subsidy scheme (complementing the previous one) for employees 
on  temporarily  forced  leave.  Employers  temporarily  not  able  to 
provide work to up to 50% of their employees are entitled to the 
scheme (under the same conditions of the previous scheme). At 
least  20%  of  lost  working  time  should  be  devoted  to  training. 
Employees may receive wage compensation up to 85% of their base 
wage.  The company is refunded 50% of the affected employee’s 
base wage up to a maximum of 805 €. The subsidy can be paid for a 
maximum  of  6  months,  but  can  be  prolonged  by  additional  6 
months. 







Changes  in  collective  dismissal  procedures  in  order  to  facilitate 
temporary  suspensions  instead  of  definitive  layoffs.  A  worker 
affected by a temporary suspension will not suffer from any loss in 
unemployment benefits rights. Also, 50% bonus has been decided 
in  the  social  security  payments  in  case  of  temporary  suspension 
(under some conditions). 
 
Sources: Own elaboration on Arpaia et al. (2010) and ILO (G20 country brief reports, 2010) 
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Table A2: STW – Eligibility and Entitlement Conditions for STW schemes 
 
   
















Austria  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Belgium  Yes 
BC: No                       
WC: Yes (or 
business plan) 
No  No  No 
BC: No                       
WC: Yes  
Canada  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Czech 
Republic  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Denmark  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Finland  Yes  Consultation  No  No  Yes  No 
France  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No 
Germany  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Hungary  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Ireland  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 




No  No  No  Yes 
Japan  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Luxembourg  Yes  Yes  No  No 
 
Yes 
Netherlands  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Norway  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Poland  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Portugal 
 





Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Spain  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Switzerland  Yes 
Individual 
Agreement 
No  No  No  No 
Note: Justification of Economic Need = firms must provide a proof, such as a minimum reduction in production 
and/or  business  activity;  Social  Partner  Agreement  =  an  explicit  agreement  between  the  social  partner  is 
required; No Dismissal = prohibition of dismissal during participation in STW schemes;  Compulsory Training = 
workers have to participate in special training programmes; Recovery Plan = firms must develop recovery plan; 
Job Search Requirement = workers are required to search for a job while participating to STW schemes. 
 
BC:  blue  collar;  WC:  white  collar;  CIGO:  Cassa  Integrazione  Guadagni  Ordinaria;  CIGS:  Cassa  Integrazione 
Guadagni Straordinaria 
 
Source: Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn, 2010 (information provided by delegates to the OECD Working 
Party on Employment). 
   47 
Table A3: STW – Further Design Features 
Country 
Average  
Cost to Employer  














Austria  16.75%  47.8%  10%  90%  24 
Belgium  0.00%  49.6%  0%  100%  4.5 
Canada  0.00%  46.1%  20%  60%  12 
Czech 
Republic 
25.37%  49.5%  0%  100% 
6 
Denmark  0.00%  42.2%  40%  100%  6 
France  38.84%  49.7%  0%  100%  13 
Germany  8.15%  48.0%  10%  100%  24 
Hungary  0.00%  49.5%  20%  100%  12 
 Ireland  0.00%  36.2%  40%  100%   
Italy  17.00%  49.8%  0%  100%  17 
Japan  30.62%  49.6%  0%  100%  28 
Luxembourg  8.28%  49.8%  0%  50%  6 
Netherlands  0.00%  47.3%  0%  50%  13 
Norway  23.08%  42.8%  40%  100%  12 
Poland  12.90%  49.4%  0%  100%  6 
Portugal  16.00%  49.7%  0%  100%  18 
Slovak 
Republic 
47.54%  49.5%  4%  100% 
3 
Spain  0.00%  43.6%  33%  100%  24 
Switzerland  4.62%  49.00%  10%  100%  24 
Notes: Cost to Employer = percentage of normal total labour cost for a single worker without children who 
usually earns the average wage; Average Replacement Rate = benefit from STW schemes as percentage of last 
wage  (average  between  min  and  max  replacement  rate);  Permissible  Hours  Reduction  =  minimum  and 
maximum  permissible  reductions  in  weekly  working  hours  for  short-time  workers  during  the  2008-2009 
recession (a minimum requirement of 1 hour is treated here as 0%); maximum duration = maximum duration 
of STW schemes in months. The information refers to the year 2009. 
  
Source: Alexander Hijzen and Danielle Venn, forthcoming 2011 (information provided by delegates to the OECD 
Working Party on Employment) 
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Table A4: Regression results – STW institutional determinants 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  STW take-up rate (Q1 2009 – Q2 2010) 
           
Gdp Growth [t-1]  0.0230  0.0917  0.0421  0.0300   
  (0.0783)  (0.0865)  (0.0809)  (0.0903)   
Employment Protection Index    0.374  1.020**  1.656***  1.756*** 
    (0.305)  (0.441)  (0.589)  (0.615) 
UB net replacement rate    -0.00187  -0.0174  -0.0988***  -0.104*** 
    (0.0158)  (0.0202)  (0.0358)  (0.0370) 
Bargaining centralization index    0.612***  0.480***  0.654***  0.665*** 
    (0.186)  (0.174)  (0.225)  (0.227) 
Strictness of eligibility criteria      -1.186  1.088  1.255 
      (0.861)  (1.238)  (1.286) 
Strictness of entitlement criteria      -4.618***  -6.133***  -6.465*** 
      (1.262)  (2.262)  (2.357) 
Cost to employer        0.282  0.288 
        (1.811)  (1.850) 
STW net replacement rate        0.0477**  0.0485* 
        (0.0238)  (0.0243) 
STW elasticity to hours        0.743  0.651 
        (1.168)  (1.175) 
Constant  1.594***  -0.447  1.006  -0.302  -0.857 
  (0.165)  (0.857)  (0.975)  (1.265)  (1.461) 
           
Quarterly x Year Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
Observations  105  97  94  84  84 
R-squared  0.001  0.208  0.349  0.443  0.465 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-significance levels, 
respectively.  
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Table A5: List of variables 
STW share short-time work take-up rate
WTA share working-time account participation rate
Revenue growth 09 expected growth rate of revenues in 2009
DECLINE turnover decline in 2008 vs. 2007 (1 = yes)
RISK Risk of firm closuren or part of firm closure (1 = yes)
COMPETIT 09 high competitive pressure 2009 (1 = yes)
COMPETIT 08 high competitive pressure 2008 (1 = yes)
SHORTAGE 08 labour shortages in 2008 (1 = yes)
Export share ratio of exports in turnover
HIGH R&D high share of R&D activities (1 = yes)
HIGH TECH state of the art machinery and equipment (1 = yes)
EDUCATION 2 share of workers with vocational training in % of workforce (reference category: unskilled workers)
EDUCATION 3 share of workers with university degree in % of workforce (reference category: unskilled workers)
EDUCATION 4 share of management and firm owners in % of workforce (reference category: unskilled workers)
Female share share of female workers in % of total workforce.
Part-time share share of part-time workers in % of total workforce.
Fixed-term  contract sh. share of workers with fixed contracts in % of total workforce.
TAW share share of temporary agency workers in % of workforce.
INDEPENDENT independent firm (1 = yes); reference category: dependent firm.
HEADQUARTER firm headquarter (1 = yes); reference category: dependent firm.
OWNER firn managed by owner (1 = yes); reference category: joint management.
MANAGEMENT firn managed by paid managers (1 = yes); reference category: joint management.
COLLECTAGR collective wage agreement (1 = yes).
COUNCIL workers council (1 = yes)
CHAMBER chamber membership (1 = yes)
ln empl. 2008 log number of employees subject to social-security contributions in 2008.
STW experience years since first use of short-time work
WTA experience years since first use of working time accounts  50 
Table A6: First-stage regression results 
 
Notes: Heteroscedastcity robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-
significance levels, respectively. Dependent variables are the STW take-up rate and WTA participation rate, 
respectively.  Each  regression  includes  also  firm  size,  industry  and  regional  dummy  variables.  A  list  of  the 
variables and their definitions is presented in Annex Table A5. 
   
dependent variable
Revenue growth 09 -0.22
*** (0.040) -0.037 (0.026) -0.220
*** (0.040) -0.042 (0.027)
DECLINE 0.024
*** (0.005) -0.008 (0.010) 0.024
*** (0.005) -0.009 (0.010)
CLOSURE 09 -0.03
* (0.015) -0.004 (0.039) -0.025 (0.016) -0.003 (0.039)
COMPETIT 09 0.015
*** (0.004) -0.007 (0.009) 0.015
*** (0.004) -0.006 (0.009)
SHORTAGE 08 -0 (0.005) 0.053























*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001






Female share -0 (0.000) -0.001
*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001
*** (0.000)
Part-time share -0
*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000
*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)










INDEPENDENT -0 (0.007) -0.040











ln empl. 2008 0.01
* (0.005) -0.004 (0.014) 0.010






*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.039
*** (0.002)
Observations 7969 8053 7920 7920
R
2 0.274 0.215 0.272 0.215
STW WTA STW WTA
Separate Regressions Joint Regression  51 
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